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 Abstract 
This study aims to rethink the 1919 national British rail strike from the perspective of 
Lloyd George’s Coalition Government. This dissertation argues that the government were 
willing to use all in their power to defeat the strike. Prior historians have touched upon how 
the government combatted the strike, but this study will give a more thorough examination 
of the emergency measures which were implemented. It draws from government and 
railway company reports on the strike which became available after 1970. There has been 
sparingly little research on the 1919 rail dispute since Philp Bagwell’s study in 1963. 
Bagwell’s classical approach to the strike will be rethought in the light of the newly 
accessible government and Railway Company records. A new regional approach is included, 
assessing the local and regional newspapers in the northern Home Counties and the north 
east of England.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In dedication to my Granddad, a railway driver for 50 years, and Nan. A true railway family, 
who were the inspiration for this work. 
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(1) Introduction 
The 1919 railway strike pitted one of the strongest trade unions in Britain following 
the First World War, the National Union of Railwaymen, against an employer of 
overwhelming authority, the British Government. The national rail strike began on 26 
September 1919 after negotiations broke down in a dispute over railwaymen's wages. It 
would be expected that such a dramatic event in British trade union history, a nine day 
strike just following the First World War of all the nation’s railwaymen, would have 
generated high interest from British labour historians; however, this has been far from the 
case. There has so far only been one extensive study completed on the dispute, that is, 
Philip Bagwell, The Railwaymen: A History of the National Union of Railwaymen.1 Bagwell 
was a prominent labour historian who focused on railway union history and in particular the 
history of the National Union of Railwaymen. 
The first aim of this study will be to rethink Bagwell’s study on the strike in the light 
of new research identified in the National Archives. This research includes Cabinet 
documents, railway company records, Home Office reports and reports from the many 
government departments which combatted the strike such as the Ministry of Food and the 
Ministry of War. These documents were not available to the public until 1970 which has 
meant that Bagwell did not have access to them when he wrote his study on the dispute. 
Bagwell’s study will also be rethought with new regional and county press reports. These 
reports will be taken from newspapers from the north east of England and the northern 
Home Counties, including, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, and Essex.  
                                                          
1 P. Bagwell, The Railwaymen: The History of the National Union of Railwaymen (London, 1963) 
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The second aim of this study will be to emphasize just how seriously and aggressively 
Lloyd George’s coalition government dealt with the 1919 railway strike. The government 
used everything at its disposal to defeat the railwaymen. What measures to combat the 
strike the government implemented will be analysed in this study. How the government 
viewed and addressed the strike will be evaluated with the new research from TNA.  
The first chapter of this study will focus on updating Bagwell’s narrative of the strike. 
It will also explain the context surrounding why the strike occurred; including how and why 
the negotiations between the unions and government broke down. The first aspect of the 
narrative of the strike which will be updated is whether there was a complete paralysis of 
railway traffic following the call to strike and whether there were improvements in the 
railway's service as the dispute continued. The second aspect is how many railwaymen, 
according to the official records, ceased work when the call to strike was made and how 
many returned to work as the strike progressed. The final aspect which will be assessed is 
how and why so many railwaymen came out on strike. The aim of this chapter will be to 
highlight how great a crisis the strike was for the government in terms of exactly how many 
railwaymen stopped work and how their cessation of work affected Britain’s railways. A 
regional assessment will also be included in this chapter.    
The second chapter will analyse the emergency measures which the government 
implemented to combat the strike. The first emergency measure which will be assessed is 
the government’s decision to call on public volunteers to help run the railway. The next will 
be the government’s use of road transport, and the last will be the role the Armed Forces 
played during the strike. This chapter will aim to emphasize how complex and sophisticated 
the government network to combat the strike was. The government dealt with the strike in 
3 
 
a decisive and aggressive manner and this chapter will provide evidence to support this 
argument. 
The third chapter will focus on the government’s use of the national and regional 
press. The government’s harnessing of the press from the outset of the strike to the end can 
be regarded as an extension of the government’s wider emergency measures to combat the 
dispute. This chapter will aim to emphasize the government’s willingness to use all in its 
power to break the strike. The government’s use of the press as a strike breaking tool was 
met with stern opposition by the railway unions. The railway union’s counterattack in the 
press will be evaluated in this chapter. A regional comparison between the local and county 
papers in the north east of England and the northern Home Counties will also be included.  
This study will start by addressing the historiography of the dispute. This will begin 
with an assessment of Bagwell’s research on the strike. Some reasons why the 1919 railway 
strike and railway trade unionism, in general, has been overlooked in the historiography will 
follow. With Labour History in Britain not focusing on the railway strike or the railway 
unions an assessment of what the focuses were and how they have changed over the 
decades will come next. Where Labour History in Britain is now and how this study fits into 
the current focus will conclude this chapter. 
The 1919 Railway Strike and Philip Bagwell 
Bagwell's contribution to railway union history is vast, and the labour and transport 
historian can be regarded as the authority on both the railway strike of 1919 and the history 
of the National Union of Railwaymen. Bagwell wrote two major works on the National Union 
of Railwaymen. The first in 1963 covered the early activities of railway trade unionists in the 
mid-19th century up to the Transport Act of 1953 and included the 1919 railway strike. The 
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second major work on the NUR came in 1983 and covered the history of the union from 
after the Second World War up until 1980.2 Bagwell produced a wide array of works on 
transport and industrial relations history while also being a prominent member of the British 
Labour History Society serving as the society’s general secretary for five years.3 He has been 
cited in the majority of major studies on British trade union history which cover railway 
union history. Bagwell has been described by Neville Kirk in the Labour History Review in 
2010 as being one of the prominent labour historians who was fundamental to the early 
development of the Labour History Society; amongst others, Kirk includes Eric Hobsbawm 
and Asa Briggs.4 It is also worth considering when assessing Bagwell's work on the 1919 
railway strike that the labour historian regarded himself as a Marxist Christian.5 Bagwell’s 
strong socialist beliefs contributed to why the historian focused on working class and trade 
union history.   
A particular focus of Bagwell’s study on the railway strike is the negotiations which 
took place between the Government and the Railway Unions that eventually led to the 
outbreak of the dispute. Bagwell provided a detailed analysis of the discussions between the 
government and the railway union executives from when the issue of the standardisation of 
the railwaymen's pay arose during March 1919 to the eventual climax of the strike itself on 
5 October. One of the major arguments Bagwell presented is that the railway union 
                                                          
2 P. Bagwell, The Railwaymen: The History of the National Union of Railwaymen (London, 1963), & P. Bagwell, 
The Railwaymen: The History of the National Union of Railwaymen: Volume 2: The Beeching Era and After 
(London, 1982) 
3 P. Bagwell, ‘The Triple Alliance’, in Asa Briggs & J. Saville, Essays in Labour History, 1886-1923, (London, 
1971); P. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution from 1770 (London, 1974 & second extended ed, London 1988); & 
P. Bagwell, & P. Lyth, Transport in Britain 1750-2000: From Canal Lock to Gridlock (London, 2002) 
4 N. Kirk, ‘Challenge, Crisis, and Renewal? Themes in the Labour History of Britain, 1960–2010’, The Labour 
History Review, Vol. 75 No. 2 (Liverpool, 2010), p. 169 
5 D. Rubinstein, ‘Philip Bagwell: Obituary’, The Guardian, (14/3/2006) 
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executive did not want a strike and that they did everything they could to avoid one.6 
Bagwell asserted instead that the breakdown in negotiations was caused by the government 
purposely and that at least some members of the cabinet wanted the strike. It is worth 
noting that Bagwell emphasized how the cabinet contained highly conservative members, 
such as Winston Churchill, the Geddes brothers and Bonar Law, who were all aiming for “the 
restoration of Britain's competitive position by reduction in wages.”7  
To a lesser extent, Bagwell has addressed the narrative of the strike in his study on 
the dispute. Bagwell stressed the early success of the strike for the railway unions and 
provided evidence for a complete stoppage of Britain’s railwaymen on the opening weekend 
of the dispute. Bagwell cited in his analysis of the dispute reports from Glasgow, Cambridge, 
and Carlisle where apparently all the men had ceased work following the call.8 These reports 
that Bagwell cited on the numbers of men who ceased work are taken from the national 
daily press, particularly The Times. Bagwell argued that following the total walkout of the 
nation’s railwaymen there was a near complete cessation of railway traffic at the beginning 
of the dispute. Bagwell used the examples of Derby, where only three trains were running 
on the first day of the strike in comparison to the usual 130, and the South Eastern line 
where railway traffic had been completely suspended on the first day of the strike.9 With 
the new government and railway company documentation on the strike it is now possible to 
update how many railwaymen came out on strike at the heralded successful beginning of 
the dispute and how many, if any, returned to work as the strike developed. It is also 
possible with this new research to analyse how many trains were being run by the railway 
                                                          
6 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 386 
7 Ibid., p. 384 
8 Ibid., p. 388-9  
9 Ibid., pp. 387-8 
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companies as the strike progressed. Whether the number of railwaymen who returned to 
work as the strike progressed had any correlation with increasing numbers of trains being 
run on the government’s emergency service will be assessed in this study.  
Bagwell has also briefly examined the government’s emergency measures in his 
history of the dispute. These emergency measures include the government’s call for 
volunteers, the government’s harnessing of road transport and the government’s use of the 
army. In regards to the call for volunteers, Bagwell asserted that it was well received with all 
echelons of society offering their services. Bagwell briefly touched on some of the roles of 
the volunteers arguing that the “favourite occupation with many of the volunteers was 
exercising the railway horses and cleaning out their stables.”10 There is, however, no 
discussion on the practical use of the volunteers as an emergency strike breaking measure 
and no analysis as to whether their intervention had any effect on the strike. What jobs the 
volunteers did and whether they were effective will be updated in chapter two via the new 
government and railway company records. In respect to the government’s use of road 
transport, Bagwell argued that the emergency measure worked effectively.11 Bagwell only 
briefly touches on the road transport which was implemented during the strike, however. 
The government’s use of the army is an emergency measure which Bagwell has 
observed in a little more detail. Bagwell in his analysis introduces the army’s main role 
during the dispute, which was to guard essential and vulnerable points, and emphasises 
how the striking railwaymen and soldiers were amicable during the dispute. By examining 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 389 
11 Ibid., p. 390 
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the new government and railway company research, it is possible to advance and expand on 
Bagwell’s prior research on both road transport and the use of the Armed Forces.   
Another element of the 1919 railway strike which Bagwell examined is the utilization 
of the mass media by both the government and the railway unions during the strike. Bagwell 
provides evidence that the government launched an attack on the railwaymen via the 
national newspapers and the cinema while the railway unions counterattacked with 
propaganda of their own.12 Bagwell argued, in regards to the national press, that they were 
“almost unanimous in (their) opposition to the railwaymen at the beginning of the strike” 
however, by the end of the strike they sided with, and were much more sympathetic to, the 
railwaymen's cause.13  
Through the 1960s, 70s and into the 80s British labour history has been described as 
being in a ‘Golden Age’ with labour history focused on the issue of social class and ‘history 
from below.'14 The 60s and 70s witnessed student and worker protests as well as other 
forms of social revolution and this impacted on the history being produced at the time. With 
the focus on social class, there were many studies aimed towards the trade union 
movement in Britain from the 1830s onwards. Bagwell was one of only two labour 
historians during the ‘Golden Age’ of labour history that chose to focus on the history of 
British railway trade unionism. The other was Brian Murphy who wrote a study on the ASLEF 
from 1880 to 1980 published in 1980 by the ASLEF.15  Murphy’s study is typical of the 
classical period of labour history with its focus being on the early struggles of the union and 
how it developed through the twentieth century. This work is not as detailed as Bagwell’s, 
                                                          
12 Ibid., pp. 392-5 
13 Ibid., p. 395 
14 N. Kirk, ‘Challenge, Crisis, and Renewal?’, pp. 162–80 
15 B. Murphy, ALSEF 1880-1980: A Hundred Years of the Locoman’s Trade Union (London, 1980) 
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but it does give an overview of the major flashpoints in the union’s history. The 1919 rail 
strike does feature, but no real emphasis is put on its importance. Instead, the 1911 national 
rail strike and the 1926 general strike take more focus.  
The reason so few labour historians took an interest in railway union history was 
partly because there was an emphasis in British labour history on the history of the coal 
miners and the coal mining unions.16 This was due to the mining unions’ economic and 
political importance to the country during the 1960s and 1970s. It may have also been 
because of the miners’ distinctive culture in Britain; there were mining villages and whole 
communities built around the mining industry. This can be especially noted in the north east 
of England and South Wales where the mining communities were particularly shaped by the 
industry. The railwaymen also had their own cultural distinctiveness. Certain areas of 
Britain, such as Swindon and Crewe, became so reliant on the railway that they were known 
as railway towns. Another potential reason there has been a greater exploration into the 
lives and experiences of the coal miners, in comparison to the railwaymen, is because of the 
dangerous and dirty nature of the work. It is for this reason that on 4 September 1919, 
General Secretary of the NUR, James Henry Thomas, claimed he was not going to ballot his 
membership on a potential strike. Thomas argued that “you cannot blackleg the miners,” 
but the government can and will call on volunteers to run a skeleton service on the 
railway.17  
                                                          
16 R. P. Arnot, South Wales miners (1967); R. P. Arnot, The Miners; One Union, One Industry: a History of the 
National Union of Mineworkers, 1939-46. (1979); K. Brown, 'The lodges of the Durham Miners' Association, 
1869-1926', NH (1987); H. Francis & D. Smith, The Fed: a history of the South Wales miners in the twentieth 
century (1980); M. Daunton 'Miners' houses: South Wales and the great Northern coalfield, 1880-1914', IRSH 
(1980) 
17 C. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War Coalition, 1918-1922 (London, 1990), p. 
217 
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A further reason why the 1919 railway strike has been overlooked is because of the 
focus in labour history on the 1926 general strike. The 1926 general strike has been 
examined extensively in both national and regional studies. A compilation of the many 
works can be found in a select bibliography compiled by John McIlroy, Alan Campbell, Keith 
Laybourn and Quentin Outram in 2006.18 During the classical period of labour history 
studies on the strike have focused predominantly on the effect the dispute had on the trade 
union movement. The strike has often been regarded as the end of the trade union 
militancy which followed the First World War. As Martin Jacques argues when discussing the 
‘Consequences of the General Strike’ in 1976, “1926 proved to be a turning-point in the 
development of the working-class movement: it marked the end of the last great period of 
working–class militancy.”19 James Cronin in 1984 highlights and focuses on the 1926 general 
strike as the pivotal event which witnessed the restoration of the “dominance of capitalism” 
following the First World War.20 Cronin is typical of the classical period of labour history as 
he presents the working classes after the general strike as being “deeply resentful of their 
employers and of the obviously anti-labour character of the Conservative rule.”21 
One study from the classical era of labour history which did examine the period just 
following the First World War is Kenneth Morgan’s, Consensus and Disunity.22 This analysis 
provides crucial context to the politics surrounding the Lloyd George Coalition government 
following the war. Morgan argues, when discussing the ability of the government to deal 
with the challenges of labour in the years following the war, that “the ministers and civil 
                                                          
18 ‘The General Strike and Mining Lockout of 1926: A Select Bibliography’, Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, Issue 21, 2006 
19 M. Jacques, 'Consequences of the General Strike', in J. Skelly, (ed.) The 1926 General Strike (London, 1976), 
p. 275 
20 J. E. Cronin, Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979 (London, 1984), p. 46 
21 Ibid., p. 146 
22 K. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 (Oxford, 1979)  
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servants responsible for handling them were often peculiarly ill-equipped for treating such a 
sensitive and vital area of policy.”23 The best example of a minister that was not properly 
equipped to deal with the issues of labour was Sir Auckland Geddes. Morgan argues that not 
only was Geddes “out his depth” when dealing with the unions but that his poor judgement 
led to the hastening of the 1919 rail strike itself.24 
From the mid-1980s, studies on the 1926 general strike had turned away from trade 
union history and began to focus more on the cultural and social aspects of the dispute. The 
reason for the change is because of the resurgence of neo-liberalism under Thatcher. The 
1980s and onwards saw, as Kirk argues, a retreat of British labour history caused by the 
“decline of socialism, the weakened position of the trade unions and wider labour 
movement.”25 Rachelle Saltzman in 1994 examined the upper and middle class volunteers 
and how they turned what they believed to be a potentially revolutionary working-class 
movement into a nine-day May festival.26 This cultural study moves away from assessing the 
strike from a trade union perspective and focuses on the activities of the middle class 
volunteers during the dispute and the reasons behind these behaviours. Gender and 
community have also become a topic which has come under greater scrutiny with studies 
focusing on the role of women during the general strike. In 1998 Jaclyn Gier-Viskovatoff and 
Abigail Porter examined the roles of women during the 1926 general strike and the 1984 
miners’ strike. 27 The study compares the two major disputes and argues that there are 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 50 
24 Ibid., p. 51 
25 N. Kirk, ‘Challenge Crisis’, p.175 
26 R. H. Saltzman, ‘Folklore as Politics in Great Britain: Working-Class Critiques of Upper-Class Strike Breakers in 
the 1926 General Strike’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3, (July, 1994), pp. 105-121 
27 J. J. Gier-Viskovatoff & A. Porter, ‘Women of the British Coalfields on Strike in 1926 and 1984: Documenting 
Lives Using Oral History and Photography’, Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, (1998), pp. 
199-230 
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similarities between the roles of women in both. Sue Bruley in 2007 examined the general 
strike from the perspective of gender in South Wales.28 The study focuses on communal 
eating which was a fundamental aspect, according to Bruley, of community survival in the 
South Wales region during the dispute. Other cultural studies have examined how the strike 
affected industrial communities and how the strike has been remembered in those 
communities.29 
Railway Trade Union History 
Another contributing factor to this oversight of railway union history has been the 
focus in the historiography of the British railway on the engineering and economic aspects 
of the industry’s development. This argument is articulated in the Forward to Bagwell, The 
Railwaymen. S. F. Green points out in this Forward that there had been 'countless' books 
written on the railway companies and development of the railway locomotive in Britain in 
the period leading up to 1950 however “the number of books about the lives and working 
conditions of railwaymen could be counted almost on the finger of a man's hand.”30  
The three main railway union historians who came before Bagwell include John 
Raynes, who wrote a history for the ASLEF in 1921, George Alcock, who wrote a history for 
the NUR in 1922 and Norman McKillop, who wrote for the ASLEF in 1950.31 Each of these 
railway union works, similar to the classical approach to labour history, aimed to provide a 
                                                          
28 S. Bruley, ‘The Politics of Food: Gender, Family, Community and Collective Feeding in South Wales in the 
General Strike and Miners’ Lockout of 1926’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 18, Issue 1, (2007), pp. 54-
77 
29 K. Morgan, ‘Memory and Community in 1926’, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 75, Issue 1, (2013); & H. 
Barron, ‘The 1926 Miners’ Lockout: Meanings of Community in the Durham Coalfield’, Oxford Historical 
Monographs, (2010), pp. xv-314 
30 Ibid 
31 J. R. Raynes, Engines and Men: The History of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
(Leeds, 1921); G. W. Alcock, Fifty Years of Railway Trade Unionism (London, 1922); N. McKillop, The Lighted 
Flame: A History of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (London, 1950) 
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broad history of the two national railway unions, focusing on the 1880s in Britain and then 
chronologically through the major events of each railway union’s history up to the year 
before each respective work was published.  
Raynes, the earliest of the trade union historians, does address the 1919 Railway 
Strike in his work but not in detail. The area of the history of the strike Raynes focused on 
primarily was the negotiations between the railway union executive and the Government. 
Raynes argued that the “Cabinet had for weeks been quietly preparing its plans” for a 
strike.32 While Raynes alludes to the Government preparing for a strike “weeks before” 
there is not much explanation as to how. Raynes also claimed that the Governments 
attempt to run a train service during the strike was a “complete and ghastly failure.”33 While 
the service may not have come close to getting back to normal via the Government's 
initiatives, it was by no means a “ghastly failure,” as Raynes contends. Raynes used very 
emotive language in his summary of the 1919 Railway Strike and does not back up with 
evidence the claims that he makes. The fact Raynes experienced the strike first hand may 
explain the emotive language he chose to write his piece on the dispute.  
Alcock, similar to Raynes, does not go into much detail in regards to the 1919 
Railway Strike. It is probably less surprising that Raynes does not as he wrote his history for 
the ASLEF; however, considering Alcock writes for the NUR it is curious why he has not paid 
more attention to the dispute. The areas of the strike in which Alcock focused on include the 
negotiations between the NUR and the government before and during the dispute. This 
analysis of the negotiations mirrors Raynes work on the dispute. Alcock did argue that the 
“Government used all the resources of the state, but they were altogether insufficient for 
                                                          
32 Raynes, Engines and Men, p. 554 
33 Ibid., p. 555  
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public need.”34 This is the only comment Alcock makes on the strike away from the 
negotiations between the Government and the NUR's executive, and there is no evidence 
cited to back the claim that the Government did not meet the needs of the public. Alcock's 
use of primary sources is very limited, and the NUR historian has used the same sources as 
Raynes.  
McKillop, while he had nearly 30 more years to ponder the dispute in comparison to 
Raynes or Alcock, chose not to discuss the 1919 Railway Strike in his history of the ASLEF. 
McKillop instead highlighted the fact that the NUR did not support the ASLEF in an industrial 
dispute which was to take place only a few years after the 1919 dispute. McKillop 
contended that the history of the strike should not be told by himself or “any other member 
of the ASLEF.”35 This may be the same reason why Murphy in 1980 barely comments on the 
1919 national strike. McKillop did emphasize however that the ASLEF joined the 1919 
Railway Strike with no interest in the outcome of the dispute other than to help fellow 
workers on the railway.  
The Rail Strike Post-Bagwell 
The 1980s may have seen a shift in focus of British labour history to more cultural 
and gender issues, however, there are labour historians who have remained in the classical 
tradition. Hugh Clegg, Hamish Fraser, and David Howell are prominent examples of labour 
historians who have continued their focus on the history of trade unionism in Britain.36 
                                                          
34 Alcock, Fifty Years, p.554 
35 McKillop, The Lighted Flame, p. 132 
36 H. A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions Since 1889: Volume II 1911-1933 (Oxford, 1985); W. H. Fraser, A 
History of British Trade Unionism 1700-1998 (London, 1999); & D. Howell, Respectable Radicals: Studies in the 
Politics of Railway Trade Unionism (Aldershot, 1999) 
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These historians have written studies on the trade union movement which have addressed 
the 1919 rail strike in varying depth.  
A very valuable work that needs to be included here is Jane Morgan’s, Conflict and 
Order.37 Morgan’s study examines how the government dealt with labour disputes in 
England and Wales from 1900 to 1939. Morgan dedicates a chapter to ‘Police Organization 
and the Anti-Strike Machinery, 1919-1922’.38 This section gives real insight into how the 
government combatted the rising power of trade unions following the First World War. The 
work analyzes the government’s response to the 1919 railway strike, with a focus on the 
government’s use of the Armed Forces and the police.39 This is the only research which 
analyses in such depth the government’s response to the strike. 
Clegg’s extensive study on the history of British trade unionism from 1911 to 1933 
does not put any emphasis on the 1919 rail strike. Clegg focuses on the breakdown in 
negotiations between the government and the railway union executive and does not 
deviate from the established history on the strike. Clegg, however, does give an assessment 
in regards to the settlement which was accepted by the NUR which ended the dispute. Clegg 
argues that the terms agreed “were not very different from those they had rejected on 26 
September.”40  
Fraser covers a broader period in comparison to Clegg, from 1700-1998. This more 
extensive span of time has meant that Fraser has not been as detailed in his analysis as the 
former labour historian on the interwar year period. While Fraser does not go into much 
                                                          
37 J. Morgan, Conflict and Order: The Police and Labour Disputes in England and Wales, 1900-1939 (Oxford, 
1987)  
38 Ibid., pp. 75-110 
39 Ibid., pp. 89-95 
40 Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions, p. 291 
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detail on any topic during the interwar years he does focus more on certain elements; the 
miners and the mining union, the trade union movement in Clydeside and the 1926 general 
strike. Choosing these three elements as the most important is typical of the classical 
approach to labour history when examining the First World War and interwar years.  
Howell’s study examines how the railway unions developed from the 1900s to the 
years following the Second World War and how their development impacted and coalesced 
with the rise of the Labour Party. Howell argues that the railway workers were regarded as a 
“thoroughly decent section of the working class” and that this “respectability” was at the 
heart of railway union politics.41 Work on the railways was highly regimented, and discipline 
was fundamental to the running of an efficient and safe service.42 This “occupational 
culture” of discipline was central to the railway unions system of industrial relations.43  
Following the First World War Howell argues that “the respectable culture of railway trade 
unionism could be expressed through a stable system of collective bargaining.”44 Howell 
does not examine the 1919 rail strike in much depth but does emphasize how the railway 
union leaders were certainly not the revolutionaries the government had made them out to 
be at the start of the strike.45 The union leadership supported the bargaining culture which 
they had profited from during the First World War and felt that if strikes were necessary, 
they had to be short and disciplined.46 
                                                          
41 Howell, Respectable Radicals, p. 9 
42 Ibid., p. 3 
43 Ibid., p. 394 
44 Ibid., p. 9 
45 Ibid., pp. 310-11 
46 Ibid., p. 311 
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Laura Beers in 2010 published two works which covered the 1919 rail strike. 47 Beers 
analysis focuses on how the railway unions combatted the government’s early attacks 
towards the railway strike in the media. Beers work fits into the cultural focus of labour 
history and is the only purely cultural study available on the strike. Beers work aimed to 
provide a comparative analysis between the 1919 railway strike and the 1926 general strike. 
Beers argued that if labour launched a publicity campaign during the 1926 strike, similar to 
that of 1919, the public would have better understood the labour movement’s grievances 
and the outcome of the 1926 general strike may have been different.48 There is also a 
compelling argument to suggest that if General Secretary Thomas and the other executives 
of the two railway unions were willing to call on the Triple Alliance, the outcome of the 1919 
railway strike would have undoubtedly been a very different story. Beers has followed a 
similar argument to Bagwell in her work which is that the media shifted its attitudes as the 
strike progressed from anti-railwaymen at the start to more pro-railwaymen at the end. 
New Directions 
The focus of labour history in Britain has recently turned towards the ‘Great Labour 
Unrest’ of 1911 to 1914. This resurgence of interest in the period has stemmed from it being 
the era’s 100 year anniversary. In the Labour History Review’s special edition on the ‘Great 
Labour Unrest’ Yann Beliard argues that the period “has not been celebrated in the way the 
1926 general was for its eightieth anniversary or the miners’ strike of 1984 - 1985 was for its 
twenty-fifth.” There are a variety of reasons Beliard offers to explain why. Beliard argues 
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that the 1911 to 1914 period only held the epithet of ‘the greatest labour rebellion in British 
history’ for ten years with the post war agitations of 1919 to 1923 dwarfing it vastly in scale. 
Beliard also highlights how the First World War cast the prewar industrial unrest events into 
a shadow.49 The Journal of Historical Studies in Industrial Relations in 2012 has also focused 
on the 1911 to 1914 period with particular emphasis on the 1911 national rail strike.50 
These new studies on the 1911 rail strike are moving back towards the classical 
approach to labour history. The studies analyze the effect of the strike on the overall trade 
union movement and how the working classes were uniting together to fight against a ruling 
elite whose aim was to keep workers’ wages and rights down. Sam Davies and Ron Noon’s 
study examines who exactly was involved in the 1911 Liverpool General Transport Strike by 
assessing press reports, court records, and census returns as well as other sources.51 The 
main argument Davies and Noon presents is that the state overreacted enormously, by the 
employment of troops and police, to legitimate industrial and civil protest. While the 
government was unjustified in their actions, Davies and Noon celebrate the “remarkable 
solidarity of many thousands of workers engaged in a struggle for an improvement in their 
miserable wages and working and living conditions.”52 Alex Gordon in his study on the first 
national rail strike focuses on the effects the dispute had on the overall trade union 
movement. Gordon argues that the massive response of railwaymen to the strike, the 
equally massive response of the government in support of the railway companies set “in 
train a course of events that, in less than eighteen months, led to the founding of a new 
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industrial and political force, the National Union of Railwaymen.”53 David Howell, in his 
study, points out that the dispute was “largely confined to industrial centers of the north, 
the Midlands, and south Wales.”54 Howell goes on to state that the strike even in the most 
solid areas was not complete.55  
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(2) The Context of the Strike 
This chapter will examine the narrative of the dispute in Britain with a new regional 
perspective being added from the northern Home Counties and the north east of England. 
The first section of this chapter will address what caused the strike and why. The second 
section will examine just how serious a crisis the rail strike was by focusing on how many 
trains were being run by the railway companies from the start to the finish of the dispute 
according to official government and railway company reports. The third section will assess 
how many railwaymen came out on strike. Whether any railwaymen remained loyal during 
the strike is a very important question and potentially helps answer why certain railway 
companies were able to run better train services through the strike than others. The final 
aspect of the strike’s narrative which will be addressed is why and how so many railwaymen 
came out on strike. This updated narrative of the strike will draw from new research 
gathered from TNA. 
Labour Unrest of 1919 
The national railway strike was not the only industrial conflict Lloyd George’s 
Coalition Government had to contend with following the First World War. There were 
strikes in a host of different industries which were focused on maintaining wage increases 
and condition improvements achieved by workers during the war. One of the most 
concerning episodes of labour unrest for the government was the Clydeside Strike of 
Engineers and Shipbuilders in January 1919. The striker's demands were for a 40 hour work 
week with the aim that discharged soldiers coming back into the workforce could find 
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employment.56 The dispute culminated in a reported 30’000 protestors violently clashing 
with police on 31 January. Troops and tanks were moved into Glasgow to quell the disorder 
which was described by Secretary for Scotland Robert Munro as being ‘a Bolshevist 
Uprising.'57 According to labour historian Kenneth  
Morgan, every “major labour dispute brought approaches from the government to 
the army and naval chiefs of staff to ensure that the maximum fighting power could be 
brought to bear to suppress the revolutionary working class.”58  
One industry which was to prove particularly problematic for Lloyd George’s 
Government in 1919 was the coal mines. The government during the war had taken the 
mines under state control. This government ownership led to vast improvements in working 
conditions and wages for the miners.59 The main aim of the miners’ union after the war was 
to maintain and build upon the successes they achieved during the war. In February 1919 
the miners’ union set out what they wanted to achieve from their negotiations with the 
government; which was for a 6 hour day, an advance of 30 percent on basic wage rates and 
nationalisation of the mines.60 The government under threat of a national strike quickly set 
up a Royal Commission which was neutrally chaired by Mr. Justice Sankey. The Commission 
agreed to a wage increase in March.61 The Commission raised the issue of nationalisation in 
July, but this was rejected officially by Lloyd George on 19 August.62 The miners were forced 
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to accept the government’s decision with the Sankey wage enough to temporarily calm 
some of the tension. 
The railways similar to the coal mines came under government ownership during the 
war. This ownership was extremely beneficial to the railwaymen with wages and conditions 
both being improved. The railway unions gained some concessions from the government 
early in 1919, including the 8 hour day.63 The issue of wages was not to be so simply 
resolved. In regards to wages on the British railway, it was not a case of simply lowering or 
raising the railwaymen’s pay. This was because there was no standard base rate of pay for 
railwaymen in the country. For example, a railwayman in one area, doing the same labour, 
in the same conditions, was receiving differing pay to another railwayman working in a 
different area.64 The Government, with agreement from the railway unions, believed it in 
the benefit of all to lower the amount of grades on the railway and then standardise their 
rates of pay.65 It is the debate on the standardisation of wages that led to the break down in 
relations between the NUR and the government. This is because the government decided to 
offer the locomotivemen standardisation upwards in August 1919.66 This meant that no 
locomotiveman would have suffered a decrease in wages. The government did not offer this 
wage agreement to the rest of the railwaymen which naturally created real tension between 
the NUR and the government.  
Although the issue of the standardisation of pay was eventually going to lead to the 
strike, this did not have to be the case. Both the General Secretary, Thomas, and the 
President, Charlie Cramp, of the NUR, were moderate trade unionists who were opposed to 
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striking unless absolutely necessary.67 Thomas used his diplomatic abilities earlier in the 
year to negotiate a prolongation of the wartime bonuses which were to be continued until 
December 1919.68 It was this intervention which helped avert a strike in March. There was a 
combination of pressure from the more radical members of the NUR Executive to strike and 
the poor handling of negotiations from government ministers, notably Auckland Geddes, 
which eventually led to Thomas having no choice but to begin the dispute.69 Auckland 
Geddes was the President of the Board of Trade and took a chief role in the negotiations 
with the railway union executive. Geddes, Morgan argues, “was hopelessly adrift, slow-
witted, rigid and personally unsympathetic,” when it came to questions of labour.70 Geddes 
alienated Thomas throughout the negotiation period and his comment that the 
government’s offer to the railwaymen was ‘definitive’ gave the railway union executive little 
option but to call the strike which they did.71  
Just how moderate Thomas was is emphasized by how he did not consult the other 
Triple Alliance members, the Miners and the Transport Workers, before calling the strike.72 
This was because Thomas did not want the strike to have wider political implications. It 
would have also delayed the beginning of the strike and allowed the government to prepare 
for the dispute. On the morning of September 30, 1919, however, Thomas declared, at a 
mass meeting of railwaymen at Clapham Common, “I have refused the offer of other trade 
unions to call their men out… but I am not going to continue to do so now that I am driven 
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to fight, and my back is to the wall.”73 This seeming change in stance from General Secretary 
Thomas was followed by a meeting the subsequent day where the Railway Union Executive 
explained to around 70 delegates from organisations such as, the Labour Party, the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the Railway Clerks, the issues of the strike, however 
it must be noted that the railway union leaders emphasized at the meeting it was a dispute 
over wages only.74 It was decided during this meeting that a deputation of 11 men, including 
Arthur Henderson, Ernest Bevin, and Harry Gosling, would go and discuss with Lloyd George 
a reasonable settlement which would end the strike fairly.75 This initial meeting on 2 
October was unsuccessful, and later on that day the deputation returned to Downing Street 
accompanied with the Railway Union Executive. At this meeting, Lloyd George proposed to 
the Railway Executive that a seven day truce should be declared and that the stabilisation of 
wages and alleged unfairness can be settled and discussed then. This was declined, and on 4 
October, the members of the Downing Street deputation sent a letter to Lloyd George 
warning him that if he is not more reasonable with the Railway Executive’s demands “it 
would be impossible to avert a widespread extension of the strike with all its 
consequences.”76 It was this declaration with the threat of wide spread strikes, which was a 
key reason why the government saw fit to come to a reasonable settlement with the 
railwaymen.  
A Complete Paralysis? 
When the railway strike began at midnight on 26 September 1919, Britain’s railway 
was brought to almost a complete standstill. The first two days of the strike were the most 
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disrupted with both passenger and freight train services being significantly affected. It 
should be noted though that the Metropolitan was, as reported by the Railway Gazette on 3 
October, “the only railway in England whose regular service was never entirely 
interrupted.”77 The Metropolitan Line was the only public railway which was able to 
maintain a good service during the strike however privately owned railway lines like those in 
the north east of England were also unaffected by the dispute and were able to keep certain 
north eastern collieries open throughout the strike.78  
After the initial two days where the strike was at its most effective a real 
improvement in the number of trains ran in Briton can be noted. Sir Eric Geddes, who was 
the Minister of Transport during the strike, compiled a ‘General Railway Situation’ report 
each day of the strike, which detailed exactly how many trains were running on each line. 
Geddes reports that as early as 29 September that there had been “considerable 
improvement in the running of trains” and then on 30 September Geddes confirms that 
“Yesterday’s anticipations were realised or exceeded on all principal lines.”79 Unfortunately, 
the reports by Geddes are incomplete, and they end on 1 October. Geddes does however 
again emphasize the continuing improvement in the railway's service stating that there had 
been a “very large increase (in numbers of passenger and freight trains) from yesterday.”80  
The reports and official documents created by the Great Western Railway also 
support the idea that the railway’s service improved after the opening weekend of the 
dispute. According to the GWR’s figures on the first day of the dispute, 27 September, there 
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were 10 passenger trains ran with no freights.81 By Sunday 28 the number of passenger 
trains had increased to 28 and one freight.82 The number of passenger and freight trains 
increased on every day of the dispute according to the figures in the GWR reports.83 By 1 
October 325 passenger and 26 freight trains were recorded, and this was to increase to 568 
passenger and 48 freight trains on the penultimate day of the strike.84 
The north east of England follows a very similar pattern to that of the rest of the 
nation in regards to the paralysis of the railway at the beginning and the gradual 
improvement of the railway’s service as the dispute progressed. In the north east, the strike 
was reported to have left stations completely empty on the opening weekend of the 
dispute. The Northern Echo, for example, ran the headline, “Deserted Northern Stations,” 
on 29 September.85 The Newcastle Daily Journal and Courant also reported on the strike, in 
the same way, stressing the “desolate” looking railway stations in Sunderland and South 
Shields.86 The Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette emphasized “the complete 
paralysis of railway traffic” which was felt on the first day of the strike in the Tyneside, 
Northumberland, and Durham areas.87 However, the north eastern service began to 
improve and on 29 September, the North Eastern Railway Company managed to run 40 
trains on their system, which increased to 62 by 30 September and to 80 on 1 October.88  
The railways in Essex on the opening weekend of the strike, like the rest of the 
nation, were described by the county and local press as being left abandoned. For example, 
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Witham Railway Junction, a usually busy station was described as presenting a “forlorn and 
deserted appearance.”89 It was a similar story in the Brentwood District on the second day 
of the strike, 28 September, with only one train leaving the town.90 However, the Essex 
County, like the rest of Britain began to improve after the opening weekend, with several 
passenger trains running through Chelmsford, going from Liverpool Street to Ipswich, on 29 
September, with similar improvements occurring elsewhere.91 The situation in Cambridge 
also mimics the rest of Britain, with an initial near complete stoppage at the start and a 
gradual improvement as the strike continued. The Cambridge Daily News, on 1 October, 
reported that in Cambridge there was a “further improvement in the train service” and that 
a “few” more trains would be running on 1 October.92 By 3 October Cambridge had again 
improved and, despite the strike, was set to run 15 passenger trains on 4 October serving 
the surrounding area.93 
It is clear that the British railway service improved from the first day of the strike up 
until the last. What must be stressed is that the railway, without the vast majority of 
railwaymen, was never able to run anywhere near the number of trains that would have 
been running on a regular service at any stage during the dispute. This fact was emphasized 
by the Newcastle railwaymen, during the strike, who claimed, “A full service could only be 
secured by their return.”94 General Secretary of the ASLEF, John Bromley (1876-1945), also 
argued, when questioned by the press on the improving system, that “I will give them 500 of 
our best drivers on the top of their present service, and then beat them.”95 It was not just a 
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lack of drivers which hurt the Government’s attempts at running an emergency train 
service; it was also the lack of signalmen. The signalmen were a vital part of the running of 
the railway, and without them, serious accidents could have occurred with trains not 
knowing when to stop and proceed. To combat the lack of signalmen the ‘time interval 
system’ was used. 96 The system meant that trains would set off only after a certain amount 
of time had elapsed after the last train had gone. This was an understandably dangerous 
method because if a train had broken down on the tracks, a serious collision could have 
occurred. While no accidents did happen during the dispute, it does show how desperate 
the government was in getting a train service up and running, safe or not.  
The improving service ran by the government and the railway companies during the 
dispute may not have been up to normal standards however the maintaining of the service 
which did run certainly went in the government’s favour and drastically damaged the 
railwaymen’s overall chances of a successful resolution to the strike. As ‘G. A. Sekon’, in the 
Railway and Travel Monthly, argued in the aftermath of the strike, for a railway strike to be 
successful it must do so on the opening days, or it is “doomed to fail.”97  
Beyond All Expectation 
The 1919 rail strike had effectively brought the nation’s railway to a standstill on 27 
and 28 September. The main reason the strike was so effective at stopping the railway's 
services at the beginning of the dispute was because of the solid response from the 
railwaymen to stop work. On the first day of the strike, the union leaders, Thomas and 
Bromley, declared in their statements to the national press, that the numbers of railwaymen 
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that stopped work had “gone beyond all expectation.”98 This disciplined and solid national 
response contrasts with the 1911 national rail strike which began unofficially and only really 
took effect in the industrial centres of the nation including the north, Midlands, and South 
Wales.99  
One reason why the 1919 railway strike was more solid than the 1911 dispute was 
because of the developments in railway trade unionism. The foundation of the NUR in 1913 
with the merging of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the General Railway 
Workers' Union and the Signalmen's Society, meant that the railwaymen had a union which 
could represent their large workforce. Union membership grew substantially from 159,261 
at the union’s formation in March 1913 to 267,611 by the end of the year.100 With this 
growth came greater opportunity to push in a unified manner for wages and conditions 
improvements. During the First World War, both the NUR and the ASLEF gained recognition 
from the companies.101 This was a significant step forward for the unions and meant that 
the unions could negotiate directly with the companies. The strategy of conciliation 
particularly suited Thomas who was firmly against striking unless entirely necessary.102 The 
growth of union membership and union recognition by the companies contributed 
significantly to why the 1919 strike was so solid. 
It must be emphasized the importance of the decision made by Bromley, the General 
Secretary of the ALSEF, and the ASLEF’s executive to come out on strike in sympathy of the 
NUR. Without the ASLEF’s support, the strike would not have been as successful as the 
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locomotivemen who were members of the union would have remained at work. This is not 
to say that all the locomotivemen would have stayed at work if the ASLEF did not call a 
sympathetic strike because the NUR was the dominant union of the locomotivemen. The 
ASLEF became the dominant union of locomotivemen in the mid-1920s.103 
 
 
Figure 2: (TNA), MT 49/51, Table showing the 19 Systems which had 3000 or more working 
staff, 8/1/1920 – give the title of the paper as shown in the image?   
On 8 January, 1920, the Railway Executive Committee, which comprised of leading 
general managers on Britain’s railways, such as Sir Alexander Kaye Butterworth of the North 
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Eastern Railway and John Audley Frederick Aspinall of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, 
sent secret detailed tables of all of the railwaymen who came out on strike during the 
dispute to the Supply and Transport Sub-Committee.104 These tables included the total 
number of men on strike on each railway, the percentage of that number of men on strike in 
each railway, the percentage of that number to the total operating staff, and the number of 
men on strike in each Department. There are 63 systems which are listed in total, the 19 
which are most significant, due to the fact 3,000 or more came out on strike on them, were 
put in a separate table by the Railway Executive Committee which can be seen above (fig 
1).105 It can be noted that the total percentage of railwaymen on strike to the total staff 
ranged from 64.6 percent (24,140 railwaymen), on the Great Central Railway, to 92.25 
percent (19,849 railwaymen), on the North British Railway.106 The overall railwaymen’s 
response to strike on the Great Central Railway goes against Bagwell’s argument that there 
was a total walkout on all systems. The Great Central Railway was not the only major system 
which experienced a comparatively low total walkout, the London and North Western 
Railway was also low, only 66 percent of their total staff ceased work, which totalled 67,346 
railwaymen, the highest amount on any system.107 The average of the total number of 
railwaymen which struck on the 19 most significant systems was 80.65 percent, according to 
the data provided by the Railway Executive Committee.108 This means that approximately 
90,893 out of 454,469 railwaymen were still available to do their job on these systems which 
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would have contributed to the improvements in the number of trains being run as the strike 
progressed.  
While the total number of railwaymen who came out on strike is lower than what 
has been alluded to in the historiography, the numbers of the essential grades which came 
out on strike are higher. According to the Railway Executive Committee figures, the 
numbers of railwaymen who worked in the operating departments that came out on strike 
on the 19 most significant systems varied from 71.2 percent (4591 railwaymen) on the 
Metropolitan District and Tubes, to 99 percent (2825 railwaymen) at Taff Vale.109 The 
average percentage of railwaymen employed in the operating departments out on strike 
was 91 percent on the 19 systems.110 The operating grades support the historiography that 
the strike was a total walkout however it still must be said that the 9 percent that remained 
loyal would have contributed in a small way to the increase of trains run through the 
dispute. The importance of the operating grades to the strike is symbolised by the fact that 
the only railway to maintain a service throughout the strike was the Metropolitan Line, the 
system with the highest number of loyal operating staff.  
In a detailed report on the strike, created by the South Eastern and Chatham Railway 
Company’s Managing Committee, the figures of all of the railwaymen who had ceased work 
under the company’s management, their grade and how many men returned to work as the 
strike continued had been compiled.111 The only grade of railwaymen which came out 100 
percent on strike were the Glandpackers as can be noted via the table below (fig 2).112 88.71 
                                                          
109 Ibid 
110 Ibid 
111 (TNA), RAIL 633/445, South Eastern and Chatham Railway Company’s Managing Committee Records on 
numbers of railwaymen who came out on strike, their grade and how many railwaymen returned to work, 
(1919) 
112 Ibid 
32 
 
percent of the company’s drivers and 96.62 percent of the firemen came out on strike at the 
beginning, which, while still high, was not the total walkout that Bagwell alludes to.113 
Overall, according to the SE & CR Managing Committee’s report at the beginning of the 
strike, 19992 railwaymen came out, which totalled 79.32 percent of all the railwaymen.114 In 
regards to the railwaymen which returned to work the company reported on each day of 
the strike, with the grades and the amounts of men being noted. On 4 October the amount 
was 723 altogether who had resumed, which equalled 3.63 percent of the total railwaymen 
in the company.115  
Similar to the SE & CR, the GWR recorded the percentage of each grade of 
railwaymen out on strike each day of the dispute. One grade of railwaymen worth 
mentioning in the GWR are the drivers. This is because the drivers dropped from 85 percent 
out on strike on the first two days of the dispute to 74 percent for the rest of the dispute.116 
The reason that approximately 11 percent of the drivers decided to go back to work is not 
explained in the report, but their return would have certainly contributed to the increase in 
trains run on the system as the strike progressed.  
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Figure 3: (TNA), RAIL 633/445, Numbers of railwaymen (including percentages) who struck 
on the South Eastern and Chatham Railway, (1919) 
The Solidarity of the Railwaymen 
The decision to call the strike fell to the General Secretary of the NUR, Thomas, and 
his Executive. When the ASLEF decided to strike in sympathy the decision was made by 
General Secretary Bromley and his Executive. The railwaymen themselves were not given a 
ballot on the decision to come out on strike. It is therefore hard to determine how many 
railwaymen wanted the strike at the beginning of the dispute. According to Bagwell, the 
executive of the NUR believed that if they had not pressed the government and called a 
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national strike then it would have caused “a series of local and sectional strikes.”117 The 
chaotic and violent events of the 1911 national rail strike, which began with unofficial 
localised strikes, would have certainly impacted on the minds of the union executives.118 
Even if the railwaymen were offered a ballot on whether to strike, it would have taken far 
too long to organise. Time, after all, was the greatest weapon the railwaymen had during 
the strike; the fact the strike could be unleashed as a ‘surprise’ meant that the government 
and railway companies would have had little time to implement emergency measures to 
cope with the cessation of the railway. 
In the north east of England, the railwaymen appeared to be fully supportive of the 
strike. From the start to the finish of the dispute there were meetings of railwaymen across 
the region where proclamations were made in support of the strike. For example, on the 
first day of the dispute, 27 September, it was unanimously agreed at a meeting of the 
Newcastle branch of the NUR that they would act in accordance with union instruction.119 
There was another meeting of railwaymen on 29 September in Newcastle where it was 
agreed that the railwaymen had “withdrawn their labour willingly at the behest of their 
leaders.”120 In Middlesbrough, on 30 September there was a large meeting of railwaymen 
held at the Zion Methodist Chapel where “expressions of determination to continue the 
course, and to fight with all the resolution and resources at command.”121 In Sunderland on 
4 October, it was reported that while a few men were returning to work, there was a 
willingness and desire to carry on.122 There is no clear evidence to suggest that the 
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railwaymen were against the strike in the north east, at least in the local and regional press 
reports.   
There are a few reasons which may have contributed to the railwaymen of the north 
east’s support of the strike. One reason was that the railwaymen in the region were 
amongst some of the highest paid railway workers in the country.123 This meant that the 
government and railway company’s proposed standardisation policy, which had caused the 
strike, would have potentially decreased the regions railwaymen’s wages significantly. 
Another factor which would have added to the railwaymen’s support of the strike was the 
industrialisation of the north of east of England. At the time of the strike, the north east was 
an industrial super power, with prospering heavy industries. This industrialisation created an 
unionised population in the region; including miners, ship builders, and Dockers unions. This 
meant that the idea of worker solidarity was something which permeated through the 
community. This overall worker solidarity in the region, which was to play a significant role 
in the rise of the Labour Party in Britain, contributed to the support of the strike by the 
region’s railwaymen.  
There is also evidence to suggest that the railwaymen in the northern Home 
Counties were behind the strike. This is because there were, like in the north east of 
England, many railwaymen’s meetings which took place where the railwaymen expressed 
their support for the dispute. For example, on the evening of 26 September, the local 
Cambridge railwaymen held a mass meeting in the Midland Tavern and passed the 
resolution that they would be supporting the resolution and refusing the government’s 
offer.124 The railwaymen in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, also held mass meetings in support 
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of the dispute throughout the strike; the argument regularly presented was that they were 
not attacking the community but instead were just vying for “common justice.”125 The 
railwaymen came out fully in Aylesbury, and the pickets which arrived on 27 September left 
after four hours as there was no need for them due to no one returning to work.126 
These meetings were also used as a tool to persuade the public and other workers in 
the local area to support and understand the strike. For instance, there was a large meeting 
held on 1 October in Chelmsford, Essex, by the railwaymen where they explained to the 
public that the strike was not against the community but was against the employers, who 
were the government.127 At the same meeting, the railwaymen requested the support of 
the other trade unionists in the area, as, according to the railwaymen, if the government 
force their wages down the rest of the workers of Britain would be next.128  
The holding of local and county meetings was not the only tool the unions used to 
maintain the unity and spirits of the railwaymen. There were also hundreds of charity 
football matches that were organised across Britain and other events such as the strikers’ 
procession in Cambridge, where a large body of local strikers marched through Cambridge 
headed by a band.129 These events would have certainly roused the railwaymen’s spirits. 
There would have also been a family element to these events, where the families of the 
men on strike would have met, serving as another unifying element to the men on the 
strike. The element of family and community would have meant that returning to work 
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would have jeopardised not only the striker’s relationships with their colleagues but their 
family’s relationships with other railwaymen’s families in the community.  
The importance of family and community was even more significant in small 
communities which were reliant on the railway. An example Howell brings to light is the 
isolated railway community of Riccarton in Scotland. At Riccarton Junction, a fireman, 
Cairns, returned to work during the 1919 strike and had stones thrown through his windows 
for doing for so.130 His wife was also verbally assaulted by the strikers.131 The tensions 
between the fireman and his wife and the rest of the community did not finish with the 
ending of the strike. Cairns emphasized how the women were the “worst enemies” and that 
because his wife was from London, she was regarded as an outsider.132 The importance of 
family and the sense of community goes some way in explaining why the railwaymen came 
out on strike in such high numbers across Britain. If they remained at work, particularly in 
the smaller communities more reliant on the railway, the fallout could have been social 
ostracism for both the railwayman and his family. Cairns makes the point that the company 
management did not afford the level of protection they promised during the strike.133 It is 
safe to say that would have also been the case after the strike as well; even with the 
settlement stating that all railwaymen would have to go back to work in harmony. 
The example at Riccarton Junction was not the only instance of intimidation by 
strikers towards loyal men which were recorded during the strike. One report written by the 
Major General Staff of the General Head Quarters took note of any reported “Sabotage” or 
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“Intimidation” on each day of the strike.134 In this report, there were numerous accounts of 
violence against loyal men. On 3 October a loyal signalman reported that he had had the 
windows of his house broken during the night.135 On the same day, there were two reported 
instances of intimidation by the strikers in Leeds; an inspector was threatened with bodily 
violence, and a fireman’s house was surrounded by 150 strikers because he had returned to 
work.136 On the North Eastern Railway on 4 October the house of a loyal employee was 
entered, and the striking railwaymen urged him to leave work.137 The fact strikers went to 
the homes of loyal men represents how closely knit these railway communities were. It also 
represents the risk loyal railway workers took in returning to work. The threat of physical 
violence, coupled with the potential for social ostracism, undoubtedly had an impact on why 
so many railwaymen came out and remained out on strike.  
The North British Railway Company certainly believed that the fear of violence and 
intimidation was having an impact on why there were not more railwaymen returning to 
work. On 27 September, the NBR Company reported that “picketing is being carried on 
extensively, but if adequate protection is afforded a number of men might return to 
work.”138 The same sentiments were echoed in Leeds by the towns Chief Constable who 
believed that potentially “75 per cent of the strikers would return to duty if they were 
assured of protection.”139 It is unlikely that many more men would have gone back to work 
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even if the government and companies could have provided better protection. This is 
because it was not the direct fear of violence that stopped the railwaymen going back to 
work it was the fear of losing their place in the community.  
 
Figure 4: (TNA), MT 6/2547/7, A government poster which was aimed at getting striking 
railwaymen back to work and loyal railwaymen to remain at work. (1919) 
The mass meetings and events of strikers organised by the railway unions in the 
north east and the northern Home Counties represented the increased organisational 
abilities of the two railway unions. It also represented the idea of community and solidarity 
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amongst the railwaymen. The railwaymen often formed closely knit social groups which 
permeated not just through relationships at work but also at home and in the community. 
These meetings then occurred both because of the increased organisational abilities of the 
unions and the desire for local railwaymen to meet and discuss the strikes events. The 
meetings would have encouraged and unified the strikers and certainly would have played a 
role in deterring railwaymen that may have been considering going back to work.  
What is most striking about the solidarity and sense of community shown by the 
railwaymen is that it was not confined to certain geographical locations. The railwaymen in 
the north east of England came out in extremely high numbers and showed their support of 
the strike via meetings and events. The railwaymen in the northern Home Counties also 
came out in similar numbers and showed their support for the strike, just like in the north 
east, through attending meetings and events. The enormous difference in the 
socioeconomic structure of the north east, with its heavily unionised population and 
industrial economy, compared with the northern Home Counties, an area reliant on 
agriculture and very little unionisation, shows that the sense of solidarity of the railwaymen 
did not depend on location but on the industry itself. 
Conclusion 
The strike can be considered a complete stoppage on the opening days of the 
dispute. After this, however, the emergency train service ran by the government and railway 
companies began to improve day by day. This improvement can be noted in the government 
and railway company figures and reports. The initial stoppage was due to the 
unprecedented number of railwaymen who came out on strike following the railway union’s 
call on 26 September. The solidarity exhibited by the railwaymen in 1919 represented at the 
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time how far the railway union movement had come in the organisation and control of their 
membership since the chaos of the 1911 national rail strike. One reason why the 1919 rail 
strike had such high numbers of railwaymen ceasing work was because of the importance of 
community and social solidarity amongst the railwaymen. This is why the strike was solid 
everywhere and why local meetings were attended no matter the geographical location.  
This chapter raises questions which will be addressed in the following chapter. 
Firstly, how did the government maintain a rail service during a strike which was, in terms of 
numbers of railwaymen on strike, worse than 1911? Secondly, how did the government 
maintain order amongst the striking railwaymen so efficiently when the 1911 strike spiralled 
so wildly out of control? 
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(3) The Government’s Emergency Measures 
The nation’s railways were by far the most essential mode of transport in Britain 
in 1919; heavy industry relied upon them, the vast majority of citizens relied on them for 
travel, newspaper circulations relied on them and communities relied on them to deliver 
food and other necessities.140 With practically all of the nation’s railwaymen ceasing work at 
midnight on 26 September, Lloyd George’s Government had to make many quick and crucial 
decisions to combat the strike and maintain the essential services which the railways 
provided.  
The main aim of this chapter will be to emphasize just how seriously and 
emphatically Lloyd George’s Coalition Government dealt with the railway strike. It focuses 
on the emergency measures which the government implemented during the dispute. The 
first emergency measure which will be assessed is the government’s decision to call on 
public volunteers to help run the railway and maintain essential services. The next will be 
the role the Ministry of Food played during the dispute with a focus on the implementation 
of an emergency road transport scheme. The last measure will be the role the Police and 
Armed Forces played during the strike. 
These three emergency measures are amongst the most influential that the 
government implemented to combat the strike and all contributed to why the rail strike did 
not achieve a victory for the railwaymen on the opening days of the dispute. As these 
measures had such a profound impact on the outcome of the dispute and because they 
have been somewhat overlooked in the historiography of the strike, each measure will be 
assessed individually. Firstly, what the government hoped to achieve with each emergency 
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measure will be examined. After the emergency measures’ main roles are identified the 
question of whether they were successfully implemented will follow.  
These emergency measures would have never have been able to function without 
a complex and considered network of emergency Strike Committees, Strike Sub-Committees 
and government departments all working in harmony to combat the dispute.  
A Sophisticated Network 
When the rail strike began, Lloyd George immediately started planning how the 
government was going to deal with the dispute. This preparation to combat the strike began 
on 26 September when the Prime Minister met with the War Cabinet to “consider the 
measures necessary to cope with the situation.”141 At this Cabinet meeting, it was decided 
that a special strike committee to deal with the railway crisis should be appointed, this 
included the Minister of Transport, Sir Eric Geddes, as the Chair, the Secretary of State for 
War, Sir Winston Churchill and the Minister of Labour, Sir Robert Horne, amongst others. 
This committee was in charge of creating the government’s emergency measures.  
It should be noted that before the railway strike, according to a review of the 
strike months after the dispute written by a Special Sub-Committee under the Chairmanship 
of Sir Rhys Williams, who was parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Transport Sir Eric 
Geddes, there was no adequate organisation which existed that could deal with such a large 
industrial crisis.142 Instead, the machinery which was created to combat the strike was of an 
“organic growth,” developing and changing as the strike progressed.143 The government 
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organisation which was in place before the railway strike and that assisted in the preparing 
of the emergency measures to combat the rail strike was the Industrial Unrest Committee 
created by the Cabinet in February 1919. This Committee examined questions such as coal 
distribution in the event of a miners’ strike and the use of the army in guarding essential 
services. Owing to the magnitude of the rail strike Lloyd George and the War Cabinet, in a 
Cabinet Meeting on 14 October 1919 decided that it was necessary to replace the Industrial 
Unrest Committee with a National Emergency Committee which was entitled "The Supply 
and Transport Committee of the War Cabinet."144 This was because it was felt by Lloyd 
George and the War Cabinet that some nucleus of the emergency strike organisation should 
remain after the rail dispute so that if a similar crisis to that of the rail strike occurred again, 
the government would be better prepared to deal with it.145 The new Supply and Transport 
Committee comprised of the Minister of Transport, the Home Secretary, the President of 
the Board of Trade, the Food Controller and the Minister of Labour. The new committee was 
ordered to supervise in the preparation of the report on the strike which was to become the 
Williams report on the dispute.  
The government’s initial Strike Committee, as the strike progressed, evolved into a 
significant and sophisticated network of numerous Sub-Committees and government 
departments. In the Williams report on the strike there are a total of 17 different bodies 
recorded all working to combat the dispute; this included: the Communications Sub-
Committee, the Ministry of Food, the Employment Sub-Committee, the Protection Sub-
Committee, the Road Transport Sub-Committee and the Petrol Sub-Committee.146 Each of 
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these bodies submitted summaries of their work during the strike to the Williams Sub-
Committee and these summaries can be examined in the following pages of the Williams 
report. The complex and comprehensive nature of the government’s response to the strike 
emphasizes just how important defeating the rail strike was for their anti-union agenda.   
Lloyd George and the War Cabinet created this sophisticated network between 
the main Strike Committee, Strike Sub-Committees, government departments and the 
Railway Executive Committee so that the necessary and most effective policies and 
measures could be implemented as the events of the strike unfolded. For example, the 
Protection Sub-Committee, which was chaired by the Home Secretary Edward Shortt, was 
given the responsibility of making sure vulnerable points on the railways were guarded and 
that the necessary actions were taken, in regards to maintaining order amongst the 
railwaymen, during the strike by the appropriate departments. While the strike was 
uneventful in regards to disturbances, the Protection Sub-Committee helped coordinate and 
kept in daily contact with the Chief Constables and the Secretary of State for War. For 
example, a letter was sent on 30 September 1919 from the Home Office to all Chief 
Constables which directed the police to “at once… report any serious development, 
particularly any disorder or apprehended disorder, sabotage, etc.”147 The work of the 
Protection Sub-Committee and the collaboration between themselves and the other 
government emergency organisations certainly contributed to the lack of disturbances 
during the strike. This was because the Police forces and the Army, from the very start of 
the dispute, were highly organised and strategically positioned.148 The example of the 
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Protection Sub-Committee highlights how effective and complex the government’s Strike 
Machinery was.  
The government’s strike network also recorded exactly how many railwaymen 
went on strike in each district with percentages of each grade that went out during the 
dispute.149 This report was produced from the start of the strike and continued until the end 
of the dispute. This report allowed the government to monitor how many railwaymen 
remained on strike throughout the dispute and whether men were beginning to return to 
work. This monitoring of the numbers of men on strike was important for the choosing of 
actions the government was to take in the negotiations with the railway union executives; if 
for example there was a sharp increase of men going back to work then the government 
could have used this opportunity to press the railway executive into finishing the strike. 
Detailed reports were also produced by the government’s strike network on the numbers of 
trains being run on each railway, the amount of food in each region of the country and the 
numbers of volunteers in each railway company.150 All of this information was used to 
ensure the most effective policies and measures were being carried out throughout the 
strike. For example, if there was a dire lack of food in one area of the country then an 
appropriate solution could have been arranged by the Ministry of Food, if there was an 
increase in the number of trains being run adequate to deliver essential mail, then 
emergency services provided by the Royal Air Force could be abandoned, which they were, 
and so on.  
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Figure 5: (TNA), CAB 27/60, This is an example of the government's record keeping on 
levels of food across the country. These are the figures for stocks of refrigerated and tinned meat; 
there were reports for all other major food types such as milk and bread. 20/9/1919 
Volunteers Wanted! 
The government, in a bold move, called upon volunteers to maintain the country’s 
essential services. According to the government’s initial call for volunteers in the national 
press, “every citizen” needed to do their part in order to avert “national starvation and the 
ruin of industry.”151 The government appealed to the public on 29 September, urging 
anyone who possessed qualifications in the following areas; Engine Drivers and Firemen, 
Stokers, Signalmen, Foremen, Stablemen, (for tending to the horses) carters, checkers, 
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porters, cleaners, to come forward and make contact with the head offices or local 
superintendents of any of the railway companies.152 The railway companies also called upon 
their clerical staff to volunteer, and in the case of the Great Western Railway, the entire 
office staff volunteered their services.153 The clerical staff began voluntary positions from 
the outset of the strike.154 Voluntary jobs were not just available on the railway; there was 
also a call for volunteers who could drive a “Motor Car or Motor Lorry,” who could act as a 
Special Constable, and also anyone who was engaged in civil aviation.155 
During the 1911 national rail strike, the government called upon the Army to help 
maintain and keep the railway running.156 However, during the 1919 rail strike, at a meeting 
of a Strike Sub-Committee which was formed to assess the viability and availability of the 
Armed Forces for maintaining the railway services, it was decided that it was “most 
undesirable to compel serving soldiers, sailors or airmen to assist in maintaining the Railway 
Services of the Country.”157 This was because the government could not afford to be 
perceived to be using the Armed Forces as strikebreakers. It was instead advised by the Sub-
Committee on the use of the Armed Forces during the strike that the government should 
ask for their ‘voluntary’ assistance.158 The Armed Forces which did volunteer their services 
during the strike were instructed not to wear their uniforms while performing their 
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voluntary duties by the government.159 This was because it was feared these army 
volunteers might be misconstrued as strikebreakers.  
The main problem which the government and railway companies faced when 
calling upon volunteers to run the railway was that certain crucial railway jobs were too 
specialised for the majority of the volunteer workforce. It was not possible, for example, to 
teach a volunteer with no experience how to drive a train or operate an engine in a few 
days. The issue of signalling was also a significant problem during the strike for the railway 
companies. However, it was possible to train volunteers, in a relatively short space of time, 
to become signallers. Training centres for voluntary signallers were set up during the strike 
across the country, such as the temporary school established at Park Royal, which also 
trained, with “intensive methods,” linesmen and shunters.160 In a report by the GWR’s 
Executive on the strike the ‘desertion’ of the signalmen meant that the trains ran by the 
Company had to be worked on a “time interval system.”161 The “time interval system” 
essentially meant that a train could only run at full speed after a certain amount of time had 
elapsed after the train in front had left. This was a dangerous and outdated method because 
if there was a breakdown between stations or the train behind caught up with the train in 
front, a serious collision could have taken place; this fortunately never occurred during the 
dispute. According to the report by the Executive of the GWR, on the last days of the strike 
large numbers of signal boxes were opened owing predominantly to the work of volunteers; 
483 signal boxes were in commission by the end of the dispute, 159 manned by regular 
signalman and 373 by volunteers.162 Other voluntary jobs which were available such as 
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looking after the horses, porters, ticket collectors and cleaners were much easier to assign 
to the volunteers as they were less specialised work.  
Despite the initial challenges of organising the volunteers and training them the 
government’s emergency volunteer army did an effective job. This was mainly because the 
call for volunteers was so well received. Across Britain thousands of the general public, ex-
railwaymen and members of the Armed Forces registered their services. For example, on 30 
September, 1,500 volunteers were working on the London Underground, with 
improvements in numbers of trains run on the District and Hampstead tube.163 The London 
and North Western Railway and the GWR also had a high influx of volunteers, 2,500 and 
4000 respectively and both saw an increase in their trains ran from the start to the finish of 
the dispute.164 In a report by the General Manager of the GWR, James Milne, it is stated that 
8,625 people volunteered to work for the company with 4113 being put to work.165 Of these 
volunteers 1203 were members of the company’s staff, 2511 were taken from the Navy, 
Military, and R.A.F., 106 were Pensioners, and retired railway workers and the rest were 
members of the public.166 
The government’s call for volunteers to run the railway in Britain in response to 
the strike was met with high numbers of applicants in the north east. According to The 
Railway Gazette, the response to the call for volunteers in the region was positive with 
“several thousand (volunteers) … offering their assistance” during the strike.167 The 
response to the government’s call was immediate and continual in the region as it was 
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across the country, the Newcastle Daily Journal and Courant, as early as 29 September, 
asserted that the NER Company had received “a large number of (volunteer) 
applications.”168 In Sunderland, it was reported on 30 September that there “has been a 
good response to the appeal for volunteers,” with a number of ex-service and ex-
railwaymen, included in the list.169 On 1 October the Northern Echo reported when 
commenting on the NER that the “rail service has improved expectation because of 
excellent work done by volunteers.”170 Correspondingly the Newcastle Journal on 2 October 
recorded that a combined total of 750 names had been taken at the Town Hall and Central 
Station in Newcastle for voluntary duties. The volunteers, the Journal declared, were 
“drawn from all classes of the community.”171 The response for volunteers in the region was 
high throughout the strike as it was throughout the nation. What is harder to determine, 
however, is why exactly this was? The Newcastle Journal claims the volunteers came from 
all sections of society in the region however it is likely that the public volunteer turnout was 
mainly taken from the middle and upper classes of the region.172 During the 1926 general 
strike, the members of the public which volunteered to help break the strike were 
overwhelmingly of middle and upper class stock.173 The reason the middle and upper classes 
came out in support of the government during the general strike was because, as Rachelle 
Saltzman has argued, they believed it was their duty to crown and country to keep the 
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nation going.174 It is likely that the middle and upper classes felt the same way in the rail 
strike of 1919.  
The effectiveness of the volunteers led the Supply and Transport Committee at 
the end of the strike to question whether the government should have a permanent 
volunteer organisation set up to “meet future strikes by railway or transport workers – or 
both combined.”175 The Supply and Transport Committee on 11 November 1919 submitted 
to the Cabinet a memorandum detailing their discussions on the potential volunteer 
organisation. It was noted that for the organisation to be workable a vast number of 
volunteers would be needed as a general strike would be so debilitating to the nation.176 
The committee did not give an estimate of how many volunteers would be required, but 
they did suggest that it would take approximately 3,000 volunteers as a nucleus alone just 
to keep London’s emergency passenger service running.177 The Committee was split on 
whether a volunteer organisation should be implemented and it was “generally felt that the 
enrolment of volunteers would at once lead to trouble with Labour.”178 It was feared that 
the Trade Unions would protest immediately and vehemently against any perceived “strike 
breaking” organisation and that a strike may even be called on that ground alone.179 The 
Committee also believed the allocation of such a massive amount of public money on such 
an organisation “would be sure to raise a storm of protest from certain sections of 
Parliament and in the Press.”180 A voluntary strike-breaking organisation eventually came to 
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be in the autumn of 1925 with the creation of the Organisation for the Maintenance of 
Supplies. Its main aim, like the proposed volunteer organisation of 1919, was to provide a 
group of trained volunteers which the government could call upon to maintain essential 
services during a wide scale industrial dispute.181 
The Ministry of Food and “The Triumph of the Lorry” 
To combat the dislocation caused by the rail strike the government implemented 
an emergency Road Transport organisation. The main role of this emergency Road Transport 
scheme was to ensure that there was no shortage of food anywhere in the country during 
the dispute. The scheme originated during the First World War with the formation, by the 
government, of the Road Transport Board. The Road Transport Board was created so that 
the delivery and supply of food could be met sufficiently during the war even in the event of 
a dislocation of transport.182 As a result of the industrial unrest which occurred following the 
war the government decided it was necessary to merge the Road Transport Board into the 
Ministry of Food. This uniting of departments occurred on 21 July 1919. 183 The aim of 
uniting the two departments was so that policies could be more effectively developed in the 
case of a major industrial dispute in the future. The three main policies which were set out 
by the Minister of Food, George R. Roberts, were, in the event of a strike, to give 
‘considerable powers to Local Authorities’, to encourage ‘wholesalers and retailers to hold 
unusually large stocks of goods' and to create a ‘complete system of road transport’.184  
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The combining of the two departments, the Road Transport Board and the 
Ministry of Food could be viewed as the government knowingly preparing for the 1919 rail 
strike. This is certainly what Beatrice Webb believed as she wrote in her diary after the 
strike that the dispute had been “desired, if not engineered, by the Geddes brothers, and 
subconsciously desired by the Prime Minister.”185 Webb here is reversing Lloyd George’s 
argument in the national press, which was that the strike was “engineered for some time by 
a small but active body of men who wrought tirelessly and insidiously to exploit the labour 
organisations of this country for subversive ends.”186 If either side ‘engineered’ the strike 
then the government are the much more likely of the two to have done so, particularly 
considering the railway unions only had an inadequate £3000 immediately available at the 
start of the dispute to fight the strike.187 
When the strike began, the Ministry of Food implemented a variety of policies to 
combat the crisis. On 27 September, ‘The Divisional Food Commissions Order,' 1919, was 
enforced.188 This order meant that the Food Controller, Divisional Officers, and persons 
under their authorisation, had the power to take possession of ‘all horses and road vehicles 
in use, or capable of being used, for the transport of goods by road with certain 
exceptions.’189 The Divisional Food Commissions Order also gave the Food Commissioners 
authorisation to fix maximum prices on food. This meant that food prices would not soar 
out of control owing to the railway crisis. The ‘Public Meals Order,' 1919, was also 
introduced on 27 September, which ‘restricted the use and consumption of flour, milk, 
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butchers' meat, sugar and bread in public eating-houses.’ Similar to the ‘Public Meals 
Order,' the ‘Food Hoarding Order’ was also introduced, this law stipulated that ‘no person 
could acquire any article of food so that the quantity of such article at one time exceeded 
that required for ordinary use.’190 It was also decided on 27 September by the Home Office 
that “it may be necessary to employ, during the present emergency, drivers who are not 
provided with the usual driver’s licence or vehicles which are not registered.”191 The 
application of these laws supports the argument that the government was doing all they 
could to defeat the strike.  
The Emergency Road Transport which was spearheaded by the Ministry of Food 
worked effectively. This effectiveness is signified by the fact that there was no real shortage 
of food anywhere in Britain during the strike. 192 As a report by the Ministry of Food claims 
on 15 October 1919 after the first two to three days of the strike, “a definite and closely knit 
system of transport was developed which ensured adequate and constant supplies of even 
the more perishable articles of food.”193 The success of Road Transport was signalled at the 
time by the national press, The Times on 1 October affirming the “Triumph of the Lorry.”194 
The Railway Gazette also heralded Road Transport during the strike pointing out that not 
only has the lorry dealt with food supplies superbly but “motor traction has served from the 
beginning to help the problem in a host of ways,” such as the taking to and from work of 
season ticket holders.195 Bagwell highlights the success of Road Transport arguing that the 
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“Government’s Emergency Transport arrangements worked well.”196 For the first time in 
British history, the motor car and lorry proved that they could at least do some of the work 
of the railways. If the government had not implemented these emergency transport 
measures, then similar events to the 1911 rail strike may have occurred with shortages of 
food being reported up and down the country.197 
Emergency road transport in the north east of England worked successfully during 
the dispute with no severe shortage of food being reported at any time during the dispute. 
Colonel Alexander Leith, the Northumberland and Durham food commissioner, told the 
press on 29 September, that “everything… had worked smoothly during the weekend.”198 
There was no sign of a panic in the north east in regards to food, in fact, as the food 
controller at Hartlepool argued on 30 September in the Northern Echo, “there is not the 
slightest need for alarm in regard to the food position.”199 There was a shortage of milk 
however in Newcastle and Sunderland at the beginning of the strike.200 This shortage was 
rectified as the dispute progressed due to improvements in road transport and numbers of 
trains being run in the region. By 3 October it was reported that milk supplies were back to 
100 percent.201 
The Police and the Armed Forces 
Following the First World War, there was much opposition to using the Armed 
Forces to aid the state in industrial disputes. Most military chiefs, as Morgan argued, “hoped 
that troops would not be used on a massive scale in policing duties as they had been before 
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1914.”202 Military officials believed that that the use of the military had become out of 
control during the pre-war labour unrest. There was also fear that soldiers would not want 
to support the government any more in industrial disputes. According to a secret circular 
issued by military authorities to their commanding officers in January 1919, troops would 
preserve order and peace but would be against strike breaking.203 
Considering the opposition to the use of the Armed Forces and the potential of 
their use to exacerbate tensions with the strikers, it was naturally desirable only to use 
civilian police forces to maintain order. This was not deemed however during the national 
rail strike mainly because there were not enough police to cover all the necessary areas of 
Britain. One attempt the government made to keep the Armed Forces from having to be so 
heavily involved in the dispute was to enrol voluntary special constables. The call for special 
constables was not that successful, but this did not deter the government from deciding it 
was necessary to have a new permanent organization set up, which would perform the 
same duties as the special constables, called the ‘Citizen Guard.'204 The change of name was 
decided upon because it was argued that it might provide a “stimulus to recruiting.”205 The 
appeal for enrolment began on the penultimate day of the strike and received 70,000 
names. However, with the end of the strike came the disbandment of the organization. 
The British Armed Forces played a significant role in the 1919 rail strike. The Army, 
under the guidance of the Minister of War, Winston Churchill, was mobilised across Britain, 
guarding vulnerable and strategic positions, such as railways and power stations.206 Soldiers 
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directly mobilised around Britain at the start of the strike were 23,000.207 There were 13 
battalions and 3 cavalry regiments in “positions of readiness” and 59 battalions held in 
reserve by Command.208 It was feared, following the bloody clashes between the 
railwaymen with the police and army in the 1911 national rail strike, that the 1919 railway 
strike could have followed a similar violent route. The violence which occurred in South 
Wales in the 1911 strike prompted one unidentified government minister, at a meeting of 
the Protection Sub-Committee on 30 September 1919 to question whether there should be 
additional military forces made available in the danger points of the South Wales area.209  
The police and the military campaign was extremely aggressive in 1911 with police 
baton charges taking place and rumours of troops being instructed to shoot to kill.210 In the 
1919 strike, the government followed a completely different track. The Secretary of State on 
the first day of the dispute informed all the Chief Constables across the nation that they 
“should be careful that no demand for military assistance is made except in cases of real 
necessity.”211 The government wanted to avoid conflict with the strikers at all costs if 
possible because if the government was seen to be trying to break the strike by force 
sympathetic action amongst other workers could have occurred. During the 1911 strike, 
there was also scepticism over whether the government had used the Armed Forces illegally 
and no investigations were made into the shootings of railwaymen by troops during the 
dispute which the railwaymen had called for.212 The government in the 1919 strike could not 
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afford similar events particularly considering the revolutionary potential they believed the 
labour movement had in Britain after the war.  
The government had made the correct decision in limiting army and police 
intervention with only minor instances of violence and intimidation occurring across the 
nation during the strike. Field-Marshal Earl Haig reported on 17 October 1919, that there 
were no “serious attempts at sabotage or violence” from the striking railwaymen and that 
many of the armed forces guarding vital and vulnerable points and railways during the strike 
were relieved by the police between 1 and 4 October because of this.213 The lack of violence 
came as a surprise to the government as one report on ‘The Revolutionary Organisations in 
the United Kingdom’ suggests. The report, circulated on 2 October, by the Home Secretary 
Edward Shortt, emphasized how there was a “marked absence” of violence and sabotage 
during the dispute and that there had “never been a labour crisis of this magnitude in which 
there was so little talk of revolution.”214 
There may have been no major disruption during the strike, but there were still 
various instances of localised disruption. One report written by the Major General Staff of 
the General Head Quarters took note of any reported “Sabotage” or “Intimidation” on each 
day of the strike.215 These reports came from across the nation, and there were incidents of 
varying severity on most days of the strike. The throwing of stones and bricks at trains, 
stations and in some instances volunteers and loyal workers occurred numerous times 
during the dispute. On 1 October, the Chief Constable of Lanarkshire reported that stones 
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were thrown in the afternoon at an Engine-driver at work and that an arrest was made.216 
The next day in Manchester strikers threw stones at the Engine Staff of a passenger train 
and stones were also thrown by strikers at a train in York and Middlesbrough 
respectively.217 A couple of days later on 4 October stones were then thrown at a driver of a 
train from Victoria to Herne Bay and Birchington.218 It is also reported that on the same day 
Platelayers were stoned near Forest Gate.219 Along with the disruption caused by throwing 
stones, the strikers also attempted to sabotage the railways running by placing obstructions 
on the track and breaking railway equipment. In Nostell near Leads on 1 October a signal 
lamp was thrown to the ground, broken, and a hoisting chain was also broken.220 On the 
same day in Glasgow, the Chief Constable of the city reported “an unsuccessful attempt to 
derail a Mineral Locomotive, some damage to a Signal-box and Railway points.”221 Another 
instance occurred on 1 October in London with strikers tampering with engines in the 
absence of the volunteer engine driver on the North Western Railway.222 On 3 October 
there was more disruption caused on the tracks with six large stones being found between 
Shotton Bridge and Haswell in Durham and an obstruction placed on the main line at 
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Hayland, Swindon.223 The following day a driver on the Purley to Tadworth train in Surrey 
reported: “two heaps of stones and a broken bolt having been placed on the line.”224 
The report by the Major General Staff also includes accounts of volunteers and 
loyal men being attacked by the strikers. On 29 September the Scottish Command reported 
that strikers stopped two trains and that a fireman was injured and engine driver was 
removed from the train; troops were sent to both areas.225 On 1 October in Glasgow, there 
was an assault upon an engine driver who was proceeding to work.226 A few days later a 
lorry from Bishopsgate was attacked by a gang of 20 to 30 men, and the Assistant Carman 
was “severely handled.”227 On 4 October in Hull, two volunteers were assaulted, and one 
man badly knocked about by the strikers.228 In one more extreme event in Crewe the same 
day a striker shot his revolver three times at a train with one bullet hitting the engine.229 
Again on the same day on the London Underground strikers attacked and mauled 
volunteers at Golders Green and Lillie Bridge.230 One disturbing incident, which was 
reported on in the Daily News on 4 October, detailed the attack of two volunteers who had 
acid thrown in their faces at Clapham.231 
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The R.A.F.  
The army was not the only part of the Armed Forces which the government called 
upon to combat the strike, however. The RAF also played a fundamental role in the 
government’s strike machinery and via new research from TNA, it is possible to update their 
role in the historiography of the dispute. The government, like with the emergency road 
transport scheme, already had plans for the use of the RAF prepared before the rail strike 
broke. According to the War Cabinet Strike Committee, the “scheme for the conveyance of 
urgent Government despatches by air mail was drawn up in advance by the Home Office 
and the Air Ministry to meet precisely the emergency which arose on September 27th - a 
sudden dislocation of the mail services severing communication with the Police.”232 
The RAF had three main roles during the strike; the first was to make sure 
essential government communications could be delivered across Britain during the dispute, 
the second that newspapers and other mail could continue to be delivered and finally that 
passengers who needed to travel urgently could use the service.233 The transportation of 
essential government communications began early in the dispute when it is detailed in a 
report by the War Cabinet’s Communications Sub-Committee that on 28 September 
arrangements had “been made for an Aircraft Service for the conveyance of urgent official 
despatches to commence full operations tonight. The service will cover the whole of 
England and the greater part of Scotland.”234 In a Summary of Report by the Air Ministry, 
dated 4 December 1919, it explained that the most important role of the RAF was to 
despatch “urgent official communications” particularly between the Home Office, the 
                                                          
232 (TNA), AIR 5/44, Supply and Transport Committee: Memoranda: Work of R.A.F. in Railway Strike, (1919) 
233 (TNA), CAB 27/60, Summary of Report by the Air Ministry Regarding the 1919 Railway Strike, 4/12/1919 
234 (TNA), CAB 27/60, Communications Sub-Committee Report on the 1919 Railway Strike, 28/9/1919 
63 
 
Scottish Office and the Chief Constables across Britain.235 The report also stated that the 
RAF scheme was used to “distribute propaganda, to collect intelligence and to convey 
officials.”236 It is clear via these government reports that the RAF played a significant role 
during the rail strike and it is surprising therefore that no attention has been played to their 
activities in the historiography of the dispute.  
The government did not just call upon the RAF but also after the suggestion was 
made by the Post Office Authorities, Civil Aviation. The role of Civil Aviation was similar to 
that of the RAF; in a memorandum written by the Air Ministry on the potential expansion of 
the RAF’s service during the strike it was agreed that in “the event of traffic becoming too 
heavy for the RAF it is proposed that civilian machines should assist in the distribution of 
mail matter.”237 The report also stated that if the strike had become general Civil Aviation 
would have had to have taken greater responsibilities as the RAF would have been “mainly 
occupied in delivering important despatches, guarding vital points, etc.”238 The government 
knew the importance that the RAF and Civil Aviation had during the dispute, and this is 
symbolised by a memorandum on the use of Civil Aircraft. It was argued that “in a crisis, 
such as the present, failure in the postal services and the non-delivery of newspapers will do 
more to unsettle the public and to give credit to fantastic rumours than almost any 
conceivable disaster, conversely ability to maintain these services will do much to hold 
public confidence and to strengthen the hand of the government.”239  
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As an emergency measure to deal with the strike the RAF and Civil Aviation 
worked effectively in their roles, and this is summarised in the Report by the Air Ministry, “it 
is considered that the scheme was well planned, suitable for good and bad weather and 
capable of expansion.”240 Without the RAF and Civil Aviation, the government would have 
been in a significantly weaker position, particularly at the beginning of the strike when train 
services and the Road Transport scheme were not yet able to provide any effective service. 
This is emphasized by how it was not until 4 October the day before the end of the strike 
that the Ariel Mail Service was stopped.241  
Conclusion 
The government used all means at its disposal to defeat the rail strike. The 
harnessing of all available resources, including the Armed Forces which was an undesirable 
tactic, represents how important the government believed the strike to be. While the 
government did its best to prepare for widespread violence, positioning troops across the 
country in areas of strategic importance, the strike was almost completely peaceful. The 
railwaymen then, were able to peacefully stand up to the full force of the state’s anti-strike 
machinery and while they may not have won the fact they were not outrightly defeated was 
crucial in maintaining momentum and confidence in the overall trade union movement. The 
respectable manner in which the railwaymen conducted themselves during the strike aided 
their public image. Public opinion was to play a vital role in the strike, and that subject will 
form part of the next chapter. 
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(4) The Press and the Strike 
The government and the railway unions both used the national and the regional press to 
their fullest extent. The press, like the call for volunteers, emergency road transport and the 
use of the Armed Forces, can be understood as being another feature of the government’s 
emergency measures to combat the rail dispute.242 Public opinion was decisive during the 
strike, and both the government and the railwaymen knew success or failure in the dispute 
could have potentially hinged on an effective publicity campaign. This chapter will focus on 
the newspaper campaigns run by both sides.243 The national and regional press had the 
ability to influence millions of people in Britain and was arguably the most effective mass 
propaganda tool at the time. There is little recent research done in the historiography on 
the national press during the railway strike, excluding Laura Beers in 2010, and so far, no 
regional analysis.244 One of the aims of this chapter will be to add to the neglected 
historiography of the national and regional press during the rail strike.  
This chapter will be broken into the three most significant periods of the strike in 
terms of how the national press reported on the dispute. This will be the start of the strike, 
26 September to 30 September, then 1 to 4 October and finally the end of the strike and the 
days preceding, 5 to 10 October. It reassesses one of the main arguments presented in the 
historiography of the media during the strike. That the press sided with the government at 
the beginning of the dispute but as the strike progressed began to become more 
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sympathetic to the railwaymen. This chapter will begin by considering who were the most 
significant owners and editors of the national press. 
This chapter will include a new regional analysis of the press during the strike. How 
the county and regional press in the heavily industrialised north east of England reported on 
the strike will be compared with the regional and county papers in the largely agricultural 
northern Home Counties, including Essex, Bedfordshire, and Buckinghamshire. It would be 
expected that the local and regional papers in the north east would have largely come out in 
support of the strike. This was because the north east had a highly unionised and industrial 
workforce. With the northern Home Counties being largely agricultural, it is expected that 
the local and regional papers there would have taken a far less sympathetic approach to the 
strike. Whether this hypothesis holds true will be assessed in this chapter. 
To finish the chapter an explanation of why there was a change in how the press 
reported on the strike from 1 to 10 October will take place. This will include new 
government sources from the Cabinet archives on how the Cabinet responded and reacted 
to the change in how the press was reporting on the dispute.  
This chapter proves just how importantly the government valued both the national 
and regional press during the strike. Lloyd George and his cabinet released statements to 
the national and regional press on every day of the dispute. The use of the press was central 
to the government’s overall campaign against the railwaymen and discussions on how best 
their case could be presented in the papers occurred before the strike began. At a War 
Cabinet meeting on 26 September, it was decided that a short statement be released to the 
press with the purpose of “giving a brief summary of the points at issue and drawing 
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attention to the dastardly nature of this sudden strike.”245 It was also decided that on 27 
September, the following day, the Prime Minister “should send a short and crisp telegram, 
to be read at the public meeting in Wales which he had not been able to attend, drawing 
attention to the character of the present strike and to the fact that the railwaymen had 
placed the nation in this very serious predicament after the Government had offered to give 
consideration to the case of any grade of railwaymen.”246 This telegram occurred as planned 
with Lloyd George contending the strike was part of an “anarchist conspiracy.”247  
Northcliffe and the Daily Herald  
The reason national newspapers were so influential during the rail strike was 
because of what has been described by Kevin Williams as the ‘Northcliffe Revolution’ in 
Britain between 1890 and 1922.248 Alfred Harmsworth, later to become Lord Northcliffe, 
played a pivotal role in the transformation of the British press from its contents and layouts 
to its economic structure in this period; transforming British national newspapers into mass 
propaganda machines.249 Crucially Northcliffe owned and founded possibly the most 
important national daily paper of the early twentieth century. The Daily Mail was first 
published in 1897 and by 1902 already had the biggest circulation in the world of over a 
million which made it a valuable weapon in any propaganda war.250 Northcliffe also owned 
the Times, the Daily Mirror and the Daily Express.251 Northcliffe had total control over his 
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newspapers and believed that he could “cause the whole country to think with us overnight 
whenever we say the word.”252 Each of the papers that Northcliffe owned was staunchly 
opposed to the strike at the outset, and the press tycoon was able to promote his anti-strike 
message to both lower middle and upper classes. The Daily Mail was aimed towards the 
lower middle classes and city workers and The Times, according to Thompson, was, at the 
time of the strike, “the most politically inﬂuential newspaper among the elite classes of 
Britain.”253 
The Daily Herald was the only politically left-wing daily newspaper during the strike, 
and this is represented in its pro-strike attitude at the beginning of the rail dispute. The left-
wing press barring the Herald was not able to publish either weekly or monthly, and 
because of this, it was not possible for the railwaymen, particularly at the beginning of the 
dispute, to effectively respond to the conservative press.  The major issue for the left-
leaning press was lack of funds, and this was the case for the Herald which struggled to 
attract advertisers. At the time of the strike George Lansbury, the future Labour Party leader 
between 1932 and 1935, was the owner and editor of the paper. Under Lansbury’s control, 
the Herald was strongly socialist blaming capitalist forces for the First World War and 
supporting the Russian Revolution of 1917. With Lansbury as the editor of the Herald the 
railwaymen were guaranteed an ally in the propaganda campaign, however, one, financially 
unstable socialist daily paper, could realistically do little against the Northcliffe led anti-
strike press empire.  
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The Opening Reaction: 25 to 30 September 
When the strike began at midnight on 26 September 1919, the national press began 
an attack on the railwaymen and the railway unions for calling the strike. Lloyd George and 
his Cabinet could not have asked for a better start to their propaganda campaign, with 
nearly all of the major national daily newspapers, including the Daily Mail, The Times, the 
Daily Express and the Daily Telegraph, printing the government’s viewpoint on the strike. 
The argument which was presented in the national papers at the beginning of the dispute 
was that the strike was unjust and an attack on the power of the government and the British 
public. The Daily Mail on 27 September argued the strike was an attack on the British public 
and labelled the dispute a “Starvation Strike.”254 The Times on the same day contended that 
the dispute was a “Challenge to the State” and that the government was going to “Fight 
with all resources” to beat the railwaymen.255 The Morning Post made its feelings clear with 
the headline “A Declaration of War,” going on to argue that the railwaymen have 
“disregarded everyone’s interest except their own.”256 The idea that the strike was like a 
war between the British public and the railwaymen was a common theme at the beginning 
of the strike in the national press. The Daily Graphic described the railwaymen as being “like 
the Hun” and that the “Time had come to make a stand.”257 It should be noted that even 
before the strike had been called the Daily Sketch was already damning the railwaymen and 
railway unions, on 26 September the paper claimed that the railway union leaders were 
“tyrants” and that “no self-respecting democracy can permit the use of lightning strikes in a 
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public service.”258 The epithet of a lightning strike for the railway dispute was common in 
the press during the strike, the term directly linked to the manner in which it was believed 
the Germans began the First World War.   
Not all of the national daily press were opposed to the rail strike at the beginning of 
the dispute, the major exception being the Daily Herald. The Daily Herald directly criticised 
the other national newspapers on 27 September by arguing that the “Capitalist Press 
consoled itself, and presumably its readers, by arguing that “definitive” did not mean 
definitive.”259 The Daily Herald also emphasized that the railway union executive did not 
want to call a strike by arguing that, “Nobody likes striking. Nobody strikes lightly. Nobody 
faces what is involved in a great national stoppage of an essential industry with any but the 
heaviest sense of responsibility.”260 The only other national newspaper that presented a pro 
railway union strike story was the Morning Post. On the same day that the paper wrote the 
NUR had declared war on the nation it also presented “The Men’s Case – Mr. Thomas’s 
Tears.” In this article, the Morning Post argued, similar to the Daily Herald, that the railway 
union executive did not want to call a strike.261 Mr. Thomas is quoted as saying that “This is 
the saddest day of my life. It is with the deepest regret that I have to announce the failure to 
arrive at a settlement.”262 It is not clear why the conservative Morning Post chose to present 
a pro railway union article in their paper when none of the other conservative national daily 
papers did.  
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When comparing the regional and local with the national press, there are a number 
of differences. Firstly in both the Home Counties and the north east the weekly newspapers 
reporting on 25 or 26 September do not make any comment on the potential railway strike 
that is set to take place. All the regional newspapers do however comment on the strike in 
some detail in their next editions, the only paper to not do so was the Morpeth Herald and 
Reporter of the north east. The strange thing about the Morpeth Herald is that on 26 
September the paper reported on ‘The Labour Movement,' with articles including the 
‘Power of Working Classes’ and ‘Labour Awakening.' The paper clearly supported the labour 
movement, with their focus being on the Miners, however for whatever reason they chose 
to overlook the railwaymen’s strike.263 Another difference between the regional and 
national press is that not all of the papers which reported on the strike at the beginning of 
the dispute completely followed the government’s propaganda against the railwaymen. For 
example, the Cambridge Daily News reported on 27 September that Mr. Smillie, the miner’s 
leader talking about the strike, claimed that “a great industrial upheaval could only be 
averted by the men securing their just claims.”264 The Cambridge Daily News on the same 
day also included Mr. Thomas’ side of the argument along with the government’s. The 
article claimed that Mr. Thomas had attempted to negotiate with the Prime Minister in an 
offer which was regarded as a “ray of hope” in Mr. Thomas’ eyes however Sir Eric Geddes 
put an untimely end to the negotiations.265 The Sunderland Daily Echo on 27 September ran 
the same article on Thomas and Sir Eric Geddes with the headline of ‘Blames Sir E Geddes: 
Mr. Thomas Allegation.'266 The north eastern paper the Evening Chronicle on 27 September 
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also presented both the government’s and the railway union’s case.267 The Sunderland Echo 
and Cambridge Daily News never reported on the strike at the beginning of the dispute 
without some sort of railway union response or article explaining the men’s side. Not only 
was the men’s case presented in these regional newspapers but there was also a lacking of 
the same sort of anti-strike rhetoric which was to define the national press on the same day. 
What the presentation of the men’s case in these regional newspapers could suggest is that 
the government had less power, or concern, over these smaller circulation newspapers in 
comparison to the national press. It also could have been because the local papers had to 
appeal more to their local and regional readership. 
While there were instances of regional papers being more neutral at the start of the 
strike in comparison to the national papers, there were still regional papers which strongly 
followed the government’s anti-strike arguments. For example, the Newcastle Daily Journal 
and Courant came out passionately against the railway strike. On 27 September in an article 
entitled ‘Fighting the Strike,’ the Newcastle paper argued that it “is evident that the 
extremists in the railwaymen’s executive have won the upper hand, possibly against the 
saner counsels of the more level-headed, such as Mr. Thomas himself.”268 The idea of 
extremists inside the railway union executive leading the railwaymen into mayhem was one 
of the most promoted pieces of government propaganda at the start of the strike. The 
Northern Echo, which was, and still is, a prominent regional daily paper serving the north 
east, followed the government’s anti-strike case with as much rigor as any of the national 
papers on the opening days of the dispute. The Echo on 27 September argued that nothing 
“indeed could excuse the men for forcing the calamity of a general strike in September” and 
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“Such madness and careless indifference to the public welfare would be condemned by 99 
percent of the general public.”269 The Echo followed that up on 28 September with, “It is a 
strike against the community under conditions which the government consider 
unreasonable, and it will be fought with the full resources of the community.”270 
A Change in Attitude? 1 to 4 October 
Between 1 and 4 October, it is true that large segments of the national daily press, 
which were completely against the strike at the start of the dispute, began to publish more 
pro-strike articles. For example papers such as, The Times, The Daily Express, The Daily 
News, and The Daily Sketch among others all included articles which were sympathetic to 
the railwaymen’s cause by 1 October. The decision which was made by the government to 
withhold a weeks’ worth of wages to the striking railwaymen on 3 October even prompted 
the Daily Mail to be more sympathetic to the railwaymen with the argument presented in 
the paper on 4 October that the government should “pay them what they have earned.”271 
The reason for this change and the Cabinet’s response will be assessed in the last section of 
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this chapter.  
 
Figure 6: Example of NUR Propaganda during the 1919 Railway Strike, The Northern Echo, 4/10/1919 
 
Figure 7: Example of Government Propaganda during the 1919 Railway Strike, The Northern Echo, 4/10/1919 
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From a regional perspective, from 1 to 4 October, some papers did change their 
stance towards the strike. For example, the Northern Echo became more sympathetic to the 
railwaymen’s case. The Echo on 1 October presented the men’s case under the headline 
that Mr. Thomas was ‘Fighting with his Back to the Wall.'272 The Echo is particularly 
interesting because it includes on 4 October relatively large examples of government and 
railway union propaganda which can be seen in figure one and two above. Propaganda like 
this does not appear in the same respect in any of the other regional newspapers which 
have been assessed in this study. The reason the government and the railway unions may 
have picked the Echo for these pieces of framed written propaganda could have been 
because the Echo served the whole region and had a particularly large circulation. The 
Newcastle Journal continued its anti-strike stance. The Journal argued on 4 October that 
“the government and the public have every right to object to the present or any other strike 
which takes place on the lightning lines of the syndicalist movement and before the public 
have been given any opportunity to understand and consider the issues.”273 
In regards to the weekly regional newspapers which did not comment on the strike 
at the beginning of the dispute, the majority in both the north east and the northern Home 
Counties published the government’s side. The Cambridge Independent Press and News on 3 
October argued that it was of “general opinion that the present strike is nothing more than 
a declaration of war on the community.”274  The idea of the strike being a war on the 
community is exactly how the government presented the strike in the majority of the 
national papers at the beginning of the dispute.  The Essex Newsman on 4 October, keeping 
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with the theme of the strike being like a war waged on the community, published an article 
containing this fierce condemnation of the dispute; “There have been some happenings this 
week, making us think there is still a war on. And so there is, though it isn't of the 'over the 
top' sort. Of the two I think I'd prefer the latter, because, you see, our women and kiddies 
weren't in it.”275 The Buckingham Advertiser and North Bucks Free Press refrained from the 
same rhetorical excess as the Essex Newsman however they delivered a similar message on 
4 October; “The general sense of the country will condemn the precipitate strike of the 
railwaymen. They had no urgent grievance, and yet they have plunged the country into the 
gravest of all possible industrial disasters.”276 The Essex County Chronicle, on 3 October 
sided with the government’s case with the headline, ‘Prime Minister’s Message,' in which 
Lloyd George explains the dispute is “not a strike for wages or better conditions. The 
government have reason to believe that it has been engineered for some time by a small 
but active body of men who wrought tirelessly and insidiously exploit the labour 
organisations of this country for subversive ends."277  
There were also various examples of the regional press either being sympathetic to 
the strike or at least remaining impartial, giving the views of both sides. For example, the 
Bucks Herald on 4 October presented the ‘Government’s Case’ followed directly by the 
‘Men’s Case’.278 The arguments for both sides in the Bucks Herald are of equal length, 
however the government’s does appear first. The Cambridge Daily News supports the 
railway strike more so than any of the other regional press with the headline, on 2 October, 
‘Mr Thomas’ Message: “Not Striking for Striking’s Sake”.279 While the headline does suggest 
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that the Cambridge Daily Press were more sympathetic to the strike than the majority of 
other regional papers the Cambridge paper still printed the government’s case first and also 
gave approximately three times as much space to the government’s perspective in 
comparison to the railwaymen’s.280 The Cambridge Daily Press can be viewed as being more 
sympathetic to the railwaymen’s strike than most other regional newspapers however the 
government’s case still took the priority.281 The Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette 
maintained the sympathetic stance towards the striking railwaymen that it had presented at 
the beginning of the dispute. The government’s case on 3 October was presented first, 
which was no different to nearly all of the regional and national press, however, Lloyd 
George was only given a very short segment in the Sunderland paper with the rest being 
geared toward the railwaymen’s position.282 This is what makes the Sunderland paper stand 
out in comparison to the other regional papers because it focused on the railwaymen’s case 
and to an extent ignored the government’s position.  
The Dispute Finishes: 5 to 10 October 
It is unquestionable that the British national press did begin to side with the 
railwaymen as the strike progressed; however how far the national press sided with the 
railwaymen’s case can be disputed. There are various examples in the national press at the 
end of the strike which suggests that at least portions of the national press remained anti-
strike throughout. These anti-strike articles written at the end of the strike are just as 
condemning of the strike in their tone that they were at the beginning of the dispute. For 
example, the Daily Mirror argued on 6 October that the strike “should never have 
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happened. Nine days ago the lightning strike was sprung upon the community. It came 
suddenly and secretly, like most declarations of war do.”283 The Daily Mirror here is 
criticising the railway union leaders’ choice to strike just as fervently as any national daily 
newspaper did at the beginning of the strike. The Daily Graphic on 6 October also criticised 
the railway strike claiming “the lightning strike is over” and that a settlement has been 
agreed “which saves the faces of the strike leaders, whose effort to throttle the British 
nation in a time of difficulty is one of the most hideous events in history.”284 The Daily Mail 
also continued to produce anti-strike articles, on 6 October the paper published the story, 
“Why the Strike Failed – England is too Strong for the Extremists.”285 The Evening Standard 
on 6 October argued that the “strike did savour of Prussian methods.”286 It is clear to see 
that sections of the national daily press which were opposed to the railway strike at the 
start remained so until the end. 
In the regional press, there are examples of continued anti-strike rhetoric. For 
example, in the Newcastle Daily Journal, on 6 October, the paper included the story, ‘When 
the Strike Weapon Must Fail.’ In which it was argued that the strike was not a question of 
wages but more about “broken faith, of holding the country to ransom, of a lawless attack 
on the very life of the community.” The Buckingham Advertiser and North Bucks Free Press, 
on 11 October, also emphasized their disapproval of the strike, by claiming the dispute was 
‘Needless.' The Buckingham Advertiser cites the Food Controller, G. H. Roberts, in their main 
story on the fallout of the strike, in which Roberts explains how the settlement agreed on 5 
October was the same as the one offered on 26 September. 
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However, the general sentiments of the regional press, in the north east of England 
and the Northern Home Counties, is of relief and overall neutrality. The Biggleswade 
Chronicle and Bedfordshire Gazette, on 10 October, claimed they welcomed the news that 
the strike had been settled satisfactorily and that they were pleased the railwaymen were 
commencing their duties. The Cambridge Daily News, on 6 October, claimed the settlement 
was a “triumph for the Prime Minister and the Trade Union Mediators.” The Cambridge 
Daily News also led with the story of the General Secretary of the NUR’s relief and delight at 
the settlement. The Northern Echo remained neutral and described the settlement as a 
“truce” on 6 October. The Darlington and Stockton Times also remained neutral at the end 
of the strike, arguing, the end of dispute “gave a feeling of intense relief to all classes of 
community, for there were many who were not at all hopeful that there would be a 
settlement reached.” 
Why the Apparent Sudden Shift? 
One of the most important reasons which forced the press to begin publishing more 
pro railway union articles was because of the unofficial threat of a printer’s strike. The 
printers’ union leader George Isaacs argued in the Railway Review on 3 October that the 
“railwaymen’s case is too sacred to the Labour movement as a whole to have it 
prejudiced…This ﬁght is going to be seen through and the railwaymen’s case is not going to 
suffer.”287 Isaacs clearly understood the importance of the strike to the overall trade union 
movement in Britain and also, like the railway union leaders and the government, believed 
the press had a substantial role in influencing public opinion. The threat to stop printing 
papers sent a message to both the newspaper editors and the government, and without this 
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threatened intervention it would have been hard to see such a drastic swing in favour of the 
railwaymen.  
The government took the threatened printers’ strike very seriously as reports from 
Robert Horne, the Minister of Labour, signify. On 1 October Horne reported back to the War 
Cabinet that he was concerned there was “unrest among operative printers in some London 
newspaper offices” and that printers would refuse to set up statements believed to be 
biased against the railwaymen. 288 The reason Horne and the War Cabinet were so 
concerned about the press refusing to print the government’s side of the argument was 
because they could not afford to lose ground on the all-important propaganda campaign 
against the railwaymen.289 On 8 October, Horne wrote a report for the War Cabinet looking 
back on the strike and the worrying “attitude of certain printers’ organisations.”290 Horne 
emphasized in this report the importance of the press in shaping public opinion and how 
“the Government has always been able to secure full publicity for at any rate their side of 
the case in any dispute, but this conceivably might not always be so in the future.”291 Horne 
also points out that in the days of the revolutions in Russia, Germany and Hungary in the 
years leading up to the strike, “trouble centred in general not round the government 
buildings, but round the newspaper offices.”292 The British government was used to having a 
near monopoly of control over what was presented in the press to the public, and this was 
beginning to change during the 1919 rail strike. 
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Another reason for the swing towards more pro-union articles in the national press 
was because of the work of the Labour Research Department who took control of 
publicizing the railwaymen’s case on behalf of the railway unions. The LRD was and still is an 
independent research organisation focusing on trade unions, based in London. At the time 
of the strike Robert Page Arnot was leading the organisation; two notable members of the 
society included George Douglas Howard Cole and William Mellor.293 These members of the 
group would go on to play a significant role in the labour movement in Britain, and Arnot 
and Mellor would go on to help found the British Communist Party in 1920.294 On 27 
September 1919, the LRD began preparing for how they would best combat the 
government’s statements and how they would boost public support in favour of the rail 
strike. The LRD created posters and articles which were to be included in the national daily 
newspapers.295 These articles and posters were paid for out of NUR funds, 1500 pounds a 
day for the duration of the strike.296 During the strike the LRD were helped by various 
journalists who also worked for the Daily Herald; Mellor himself worked for the Herald and 
went on to succeed Lansbury as the editor for the paper in 1926.297 Bill Paton in a brief 
review of the LRD during the rail strike in 1982, questioned whether or not the public was 
actually swayed either way by both sides propaganda. Paton argues that it “was clear 
throughout the strike that the government, the NUR and the LRD all thought that it was 
important to have public opinion on their side.”298 Paton goes on to argue that if “it is 
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accepted that newspapers have the power to provide information upon which people form 
opinions, then the campaign, by modifying that power, can be seen as a success.”299  
Conclusion 
The government utilised the press as part of its sophisticated strike breaking 
network. The importance placed on the press by the government is represented by the War 
Cabinet Meetings and reports written by the Minister of Labour Sir Robert Horne. Fortunately 
for the railwaymen, and the trade union movement, the railway unions combatted the 
government with propaganda of their own. If the government was allowed to have had 
unopposed propaganda, it is plausible that the strike would have failed. It would have failed 
because public opinion would have remained against the strike; which could have boosted 
volunteer numbers and surely would have disheartened the striking railwaymen.  
There was no clear regional distinction between the north east papers and the 
northern Home Counties papers. There were papers which came out against the strike in 
the north east, such as the Newcastle Daily Journal and Courant and the Northern Echo at 
the start of the strike. There were papers which came out against the strike in the northern 
Home Counties such as, the Cambridge Independent Press and News, the Essex Newsman, 
and the Buckingham Advertiser and North Bucks Free Press. There were also papers which 
supported the strike in both the north east and the northern Home Counties. It is interesting 
that there were papers in the agricultural northern Home Counties which supported the 
strike; particularly in Cambridge where the Member of Parliament was, in fact, Sir Eric 
Geddes. It would appear that the support of the strike from the local newspaper's 
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perspective was unaffected by broader patterns in Britain of unionisation and 
industrialisation.  
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(5) Conclusion 
This study has sought to rethink Bagwell’s research on the 1919 railwaymen’s strike 
by examining new research from TNA. It offers a different interpretation to the railway union 
approach of Bagwell, by assessing the government’s attitude and actions towards the strike. A new 
regional assessment of the strike has also been included focusing on the local and regional 
press in the north east of England and the northern Home Counties.  
One aim of this study has been to draw attention to how serious the railway strike 
was for the government. It was a strike that was to test the resolve of the State to its fullest 
capacity. One element that made the dispute such a challenge for the government was the 
sheer number of railwaymen who came out on strike. On the 19 systems which had 3000 or 
more railwaymen, 80.65 percent ceased work. The strike was solid in all areas of Britain, not 
just in the heavily unionised populations of, for example, South Wales and the north east of 
England.  
One reason for the extremely high strike turnout was because of the increased 
organisational capacity of the railway unions following the Great War. Contributing factors 
to the development of railway trade unionism were the foundation of the NUR in 1913, the 
growth of union membership, and the fact the railway unions gained recognition from the 
companies during the First World War. 
Another reason why the strike was so complete was because of the solidarity of the 
railwaymen. It could almost be expected that the railwaymen in the north east would have 
come out on strike in high numbers, considering the high level of unionisation in the overall 
population. It is much more surprising to note that the northern Home Counties 
experienced a similar walkout. Why would railwaymen, isolated from broader patterns of 
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unionisation, strike in such high numbers? One reason, as this study highlights, could have 
been the importance of community and social standing to the railwaymen. If a railwayman 
had decided to return to work, he and his family might have faced being ostracized from the 
community. This is one reason why the holding of events by the railway unions would have 
been so effective. Not just to boost morale, but to stress the importance of community and 
togetherness. The fear for a railwayman of losing their standing in the community would 
have been an even greater concern in smaller communities, more reliant on the railway. 
This unprecedented walkout caused a complete stoppage on the railway at the start 
of the strike. This is in agreement with Bagwell’s assessment of the extent of the strike. 
Official records released after Bagwell’s study show that the government and railway 
companies were able to run a continually improving emergency train service from the 
opening weekend of the strike to the finish.  
The ability of the government to combat such a large scale industrial crisis was only 
made possible by the implementation of a series of emergency measures. It is evident that 
the government had a sophisticated network of departments and committees working 
together to ensure the best possible emergency policies were implemented during the 
strike. Arguably the three most influential emergency measures were the call for public 
volunteers, the organisation of emergency road transport, and the utilization of the police 
and the Armed Forces. The effective application of these measures was fundamental to the 
government’s success during the strike.  
The government’s volunteers helped not only on the railways but in the emergency 
road transport scheme and in civil aviation. The success of the volunteers was so that in the 
aftermath of the strike it was considered that there might be a permanent voluntary strike-
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breaking organisation set up. This organisation was decided against but did eventually come 
to fruition in 1925 with the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies, which played a 
role in defeating the 1926 general strike. Regarding the operation of emergency road 
transport, the success of the measure is highlighted by how there were no noteworthy food 
shortages anywhere during the strike.  
While there was very little violence or disorder during the strike, the police and 
Armed Forces still played an important role in the guarding of vulnerable and strategic 
positions. The RAF also played a pivotal role in delivering essential government 
communication and newspapers.  
Another tool in the government’s strikebreaking machine was propaganda. The press 
was vitally important to the government’s campaign against the railwaymen, which is 
symbolised by how one of the RAF’s primary roles was to distribute newspapers during the 
dispute. The government issued press releases on each day of the strike and at least on the 
first day of the dispute the War Cabinet had pre-discussed what the press release would 
contain. The tone of these early messages was extreme with the railway union leaders being 
accused of anarchism and attempting to create a revolution.  
In the historiography on how the press reported on the strike, both Bagwell and 
Beers provide a similar argument, that the national press was opposed to the strike at the 
beginning of the dispute, but were more supportive of the strike as it developed. This study 
has tested that hypothesis by analysing both national and regional publications.  
The national press at the start of the dispute, barring the Daily Herald, resoundingly 
supported the government’s view of the strike. At a regional level at the beginning of the 
dispute, there were papers which were more sympathetic to the strike such as the 
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Sunderland Daily Echo and the Cambridge Daily News and then papers which were totally 
opposed to the strike like the Newcastle Daily Journal and the Northern Echo.  
The aggressive and unfounded approach the government took in their press releases 
further exemplifies how desperate the government was to defeat the rail strike. 
Unfortunately for the government, the unfair accusations made against the railway union 
leaders and the strike prompted the printers to threaten to strike. This threatened strike 
combined with the railway union’s own press campaign caused a shift in favour of the 
railwaymen in the propaganda war. The national press began to print more articles 
sympathetic to the railwaymen however there were still papers, such as the Daily Mail, the 
Daily Graphic and the Evening Standard which remained anti-strike until the end of the 
dispute. From a regional perspective, the daily paper which changed its stance the most 
significantly was the Northern Echo, which became more strike sympathetic after 1 October. 
The other daily papers did not experience such a change such; the Sunderland Echo started 
pro-strike and finished pro-strike, the Newcastle Journal began anti-strike and finished that 
way.  
With its heavily unionised population, it was expected that the papers in the north 
east of England would have been, for the most part, sympathetic to the strike. With its 
population largely involved in agriculture, it was expected that the papers in the northern 
Home Counties would have been, for the most part, opposed to the strike. This was not to 
be the case for either, with both regions papers providing examples of pro-strike and anti-
strike bias. Probably the most notable being the Cambridge Daily Press, which was highly 
sympathetic to the railwaymen and the strike; even though the Member of Parliament for 
Cambridge was Sir Eric Geddes himself. The fact there is no clear regional distinction, 
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between two regions with such vastly different socio-economic structures, suggests that 
local and regional papers were unaffected by broader patterns in Britain of unionisation and 
industrialisation.  
This study has brought some attention to a crucial event in British trade union 
history, and there is potential for further research. The trade union perspective could be 
brought up to date and railway union archives, such as the NUR archives held at the 
University of Warwick, re-examined. As this study emphasized, the historiography on the 
strike is very limited. In the 1980’s, when labour history was moving more towards studies 
focused on community and culture, the 1919 railway strike was left unexamined. A cultural 
element of the history of the strike, which this study has touched upon that would benefit 
enormously from further research is how important community was to the railwaymen and 
their families during times of crisis.  There could also be a more comprehensive regional 
analysis of the strike in the future which would help build the national picture of the 
dispute.  
There is potential for further research on the government’s network of departments 
and committees which worked to defeat trade unionism in this period. There is a multitude 
of materials at TNA which can be examined.300  
The railway strike tested the resolve of both the railwaymen and the government. 
From the railwaymen’s perspective, they were able to stand up to the full might of the 
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State’s resources and not be crushed. This in itself was a victory for the confidence in the 
overall trade union movement of the time. From the government’s perspective, they were 
able to cope with an almost complete strike on the nation’s most important transport 
system. The crucial thing for both sides was that neither had lost. In the longer term, the 
settlement won by the railwaymen from the strike was far better than those in other 
industries, such as in the mining industry where workers were to suffer substantial wage 
cuts in 1921. The railwaymen were an organised and disciplined workforce willing to follow 
union orders. Thomas was a pragmatic and flexible negotiator. This combination did not just 
lead to success in the 1919 rail strike, but it also protected the railwaymen from future 
defeats to their wages and conditions throughout the turbulent 1920’s.  
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